hv_utils: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values

For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer. Ensure that
invalid values cannot cause indexing off the end of the icversion_data
array in vmbus_prep_negotiate_resp().

Signed-off-by: Andres Beltran <lkmlabelt@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by:  Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109100704.9152-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andres Beltran
2020-11-09 11:07:04 +01:00
committed by Wei Liu
parent a8c3209998
commit 06caa778d8
6 changed files with 327 additions and 201 deletions

View File

@@ -1480,6 +1480,7 @@ void vmbus_free_mmio(resource_size_t start, resource_size_t size);
#define ICMSGTYPE_SHUTDOWN 3
#define ICMSGTYPE_TIMESYNC 4
#define ICMSGTYPE_VSS 5
#define ICMSGTYPE_FCOPY 7
#define ICMSGHDRFLAG_TRANSACTION 1
#define ICMSGHDRFLAG_REQUEST 2
@@ -1523,6 +1524,12 @@ struct icmsg_hdr {
u8 reserved[2];
} __packed;
#define IC_VERSION_NEGOTIATION_MAX_VER_COUNT 100
#define ICMSG_HDR (sizeof(struct vmbuspipe_hdr) + sizeof(struct icmsg_hdr))
#define ICMSG_NEGOTIATE_PKT_SIZE(icframe_vercnt, icmsg_vercnt) \
(ICMSG_HDR + offsetof(struct icmsg_negotiate, icversion_data) + \
(((icframe_vercnt) + (icmsg_vercnt)) * sizeof(struct ic_version)))
struct icmsg_negotiate {
u16 icframe_vercnt;
u16 icmsg_vercnt;
@@ -1578,7 +1585,7 @@ struct hyperv_service_callback {
};
#define MAX_SRV_VER 0x7ffffff
extern bool vmbus_prep_negotiate_resp(struct icmsg_hdr *icmsghdrp, u8 *buf,
extern bool vmbus_prep_negotiate_resp(struct icmsg_hdr *icmsghdrp, u8 *buf, u32 buflen,
const int *fw_version, int fw_vercnt,
const int *srv_version, int srv_vercnt,
int *nego_fw_version, int *nego_srv_version);