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selinux: allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX with policy capability

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[ Upstream commit 65881e1db4e948614d9eb195b8e1197339822949 ]

These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux
always allows too.  Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file
descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it.

As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be
enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls.

Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Richard Haines
2022-02-25 17:54:38 +00:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent e48c260b0b
commit 55d192691b
4 changed files with 16 additions and 1 deletions
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7
security/selinux/include/security.h
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@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
}
static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
}
struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
struct selinux_load_state {