Files
kernel_arpi/kernel/futex/core.c
Greg Kroah-Hartman 962d1816e1 Merge 5.15.86 into android14-5.15
Changes in 5.15.86
	drm/amd/display: Manually adjust strobe for DCN303
	usb: musb: remove extra check in musb_gadget_vbus_draw
	arm64: dts: qcom: ipq6018-cp01-c1: use BLSPI1 pins
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8250-sony-xperia-edo: fix touchscreen bias-disable
	arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: Add MSM8996 Pro support
	arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: fix supported-hw in cpufreq OPP tables
	arm64: dts: qcom: msm8996: fix GPU OPP table
	ARM: dts: qcom: apq8064: fix coresight compatible
	arm64: dts: qcom: sdm630: fix UART1 pin bias
	arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845-cheza: fix AP suspend pin bias
	arm64: dts: qcom: msm8916: Drop MSS fallback compatible
	objtool, kcsan: Add volatile read/write instrumentation to whitelist
	ARM: dts: stm32: Drop stm32mp15xc.dtsi from Avenger96
	ARM: dts: stm32: Fix AV96 WLAN regulator gpio property
	drivers: soc: ti: knav_qmss_queue: Mark knav_acc_firmwares as static
	arm64: dts: qcom: pm660: Use unique ADC5_VCOIN address in node name
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8250: correct LPASS pin pull down
	soc: qcom: llcc: make irq truly optional
	arm64: dts: qcom: Correct QMP PHY child node name
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8150: fix UFS PHY registers
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8250: fix UFS PHY registers
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8350: fix UFS PHY registers
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8250: drop bogus DP PHY clock
	soc: qcom: apr: make code more reuseable
	soc: qcom: apr: Add check for idr_alloc and of_property_read_string_index
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm6125: fix SDHCI CQE reg names
	arm: dts: spear600: Fix clcd interrupt
	soc: ti: knav_qmss_queue: Use pm_runtime_resume_and_get instead of pm_runtime_get_sync
	soc: ti: knav_qmss_queue: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in knav_queue_probe
	soc: ti: smartreflex: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in omap_sr_probe
	arm64: Treat ESR_ELx as a 64-bit register
	arm64: mm: kfence: only handle translation faults
	perf: arm_dsu: Fix hotplug callback leak in dsu_pmu_init()
	perf/arm_dmc620: Fix hotplug callback leak in dmc620_pmu_init()
	perf/smmuv3: Fix hotplug callback leak in arm_smmu_pmu_init()
	arm64: dts: ti: k3-am65-main: Drop dma-coherent in crypto node
	arm64: dts: ti: k3-j721e-main: Drop dma-coherent in crypto node
	ARM: dts: nuvoton: Remove bogus unit addresses from fixed-partition nodes
	arm64: dts: mt6779: Fix devicetree build warnings
	arm64: dts: mt2712e: Fix unit_address_vs_reg warning for oscillators
	arm64: dts: mt2712e: Fix unit address for pinctrl node
	arm64: dts: mt2712-evb: Fix vproc fixed regulators unit names
	arm64: dts: mt2712-evb: Fix usb vbus regulators unit names
	arm64: dts: mediatek: pumpkin-common: Fix devicetree warnings
	arm64: dts: mediatek: mt6797: Fix 26M oscillator unit name
	ARM: dts: dove: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
	ARM: dts: armada-370: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
	ARM: dts: armada-xp: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
	ARM: dts: armada-375: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
	ARM: dts: armada-38x: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
	ARM: dts: armada-39x: Fix assigned-addresses for every PCIe Root Port
	ARM: dts: turris-omnia: Add ethernet aliases
	ARM: dts: turris-omnia: Add switch port 6 node
	arm64: dts: armada-3720-turris-mox: Add missing interrupt for RTC
	seccomp: Move copy_seccomp() to no failure path.
	pstore/ram: Fix error return code in ramoops_probe()
	ARM: mmp: fix timer_read delay
	pstore: Avoid kcore oops by vmap()ing with VM_IOREMAP
	tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Fix error handling in ftpm_mod_init()
	tpm/tpm_crb: Fix error message in __crb_relinquish_locality()
	ovl: store lower path in ovl_inode
	ovl: use ovl_copy_{real,upper}attr() wrappers
	ovl: remove privs in ovl_copyfile()
	ovl: remove privs in ovl_fallocate()
	sched/fair: Cleanup task_util and capacity type
	sched/uclamp: Fix relationship between uclamp and migration margin
	sched/uclamp: Make task_fits_capacity() use util_fits_cpu()
	sched/uclamp: Make select_idle_capacity() use util_fits_cpu()
	sched/fair: Removed useless update of p->recent_used_cpu
	sched/core: Introduce sched_asym_cpucap_active()
	sched/uclamp: Make asym_fits_capacity() use util_fits_cpu()
	cpuidle: dt: Return the correct numbers of parsed idle states
	alpha: fix TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL handling
	alpha: fix syscall entry in !AUDUT_SYSCALL case
	x86/sgx: Reduce delay and interference of enclave release
	PM: hibernate: Fix mistake in kerneldoc comment
	fs: don't audit the capability check in simple_xattr_list()
	cpufreq: qcom-hw: Fix memory leak in qcom_cpufreq_hw_read_lut()
	selftests/ftrace: event_triggers: wait longer for test_event_enable
	perf: Fix possible memleak in pmu_dev_alloc()
	lib/debugobjects: fix stat count and optimize debug_objects_mem_init
	platform/x86: huawei-wmi: fix return value calculation
	timerqueue: Use rb_entry_safe() in timerqueue_getnext()
	proc: fixup uptime selftest
	lib/fonts: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for get_default_font
	ocfs2: fix memory leak in ocfs2_stack_glue_init()
	MIPS: vpe-mt: fix possible memory leak while module exiting
	MIPS: vpe-cmp: fix possible memory leak while module exiting
	selftests/efivarfs: Add checking of the test return value
	PNP: fix name memory leak in pnp_alloc_dev()
	perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix reference count leak in sad_cfg_iio_topology()
	perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix reference count leak in hswep_has_limit_sbox()
	perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix reference count leak in snr_uncore_mmio_map()
	perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix reference count leak in __uncore_imc_init_box()
	platform/chrome: cros_usbpd_notify: Fix error handling in cros_usbpd_notify_init()
	thermal: core: fix some possible name leaks in error paths
	irqchip: gic-pm: Use pm_runtime_resume_and_get() in gic_probe()
	irqchip/wpcm450: Fix memory leak in wpcm450_aic_of_init()
	EDAC/i10nm: fix refcount leak in pci_get_dev_wrapper()
	SUNRPC: Return true/false (not 1/0) from bool functions
	NFSD: Finish converting the NFSv2 GETACL result encoder
	nfsd: don't call nfsd_file_put from client states seqfile display
	genirq/irqdesc: Don't try to remove non-existing sysfs files
	cpufreq: amd_freq_sensitivity: Add missing pci_dev_put()
	libfs: add DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED for signed value
	lib/notifier-error-inject: fix error when writing -errno to debugfs file
	debugfs: fix error when writing negative value to atomic_t debugfs file
	rapidio: fix possible name leaks when rio_add_device() fails
	rapidio: rio: fix possible name leak in rio_register_mport()
	clocksource/drivers/sh_cmt: Access registers according to spec
	mips: ralink: mt7621: define MT7621_SYSC_BASE with __iomem
	mips: ralink: mt7621: soc queries and tests as functions
	mips: ralink: mt7621: do not use kzalloc too early
	futex: Move to kernel/futex/
	futex: Resend potentially swallowed owner death notification
	cpu/hotplug: Make target_store() a nop when target == state
	cpu/hotplug: Do not bail-out in DYING/STARTING sections
	clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in dmtimer_systimer_init_clock()
	ACPICA: Fix use-after-free in acpi_ut_copy_ipackage_to_ipackage()
	uprobes/x86: Allow to probe a NOP instruction with 0x66 prefix
	x86/xen: Fix memory leak in xen_smp_intr_init{_pv}()
	x86/xen: Fix memory leak in xen_init_lock_cpu()
	xen/privcmd: Fix a possible warning in privcmd_ioctl_mmap_resource()
	PM: runtime: Do not call __rpm_callback() from rpm_idle()
	platform/chrome: cros_ec_typec: Cleanup switch handle return paths
	platform/chrome: cros_ec_typec: zero out stale pointers
	platform/x86: mxm-wmi: fix memleak in mxm_wmi_call_mx[ds|mx]()
	platform/x86: intel_scu_ipc: fix possible name leak in __intel_scu_ipc_register()
	MIPS: BCM63xx: Add check for NULL for clk in clk_enable
	MIPS: OCTEON: warn only once if deprecated link status is being used
	lockd: set other missing fields when unlocking files
	fs: sysv: Fix sysv_nblocks() returns wrong value
	rapidio: fix possible UAF when kfifo_alloc() fails
	eventfd: change int to __u64 in eventfd_signal() ifndef CONFIG_EVENTFD
	relay: fix type mismatch when allocating memory in relay_create_buf()
	hfs: Fix OOB Write in hfs_asc2mac
	rapidio: devices: fix missing put_device in mport_cdev_open
	platform/mellanox: mlxbf-pmc: Fix event typo
	wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: fix memory leak of urbs in ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_tx_urbs()
	wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: Fix use-after-free in ath9k_hif_usb_reg_in_cb()
	wifi: rtl8xxxu: Fix reading the vendor of combo chips
	drm/bridge: adv7533: remove dynamic lane switching from adv7533 bridge
	libbpf: Fix use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups
	libbpf: Fix null-pointer dereference in find_prog_by_sec_insn()
	ata: libata: move ata_{port,link,dev}_dbg to standard pr_XXX() macros
	ata: add/use ata_taskfile::{error|status} fields
	ata: libata: fix NCQ autosense logic
	ipmi: kcs: Poll OBF briefly to reduce OBE latency
	drm/amdgpu/powerplay/psm: Fix memory leak in power state init
	media: v4l2-ctrls: Fix off-by-one error in integer menu control check
	media: coda: jpeg: Add check for kmalloc
	media: adv748x: afe: Select input port when initializing AFE
	media: i2c: ad5820: Fix error path
	venus: pm_helpers: Fix error check in vcodec_domains_get()
	soreuseport: Fix socket selection for SO_INCOMING_CPU.
	media: exynos4-is: don't rely on the v4l2_async_subdev internals
	libbpf: Btf dedup identical struct test needs check for nested structs/arrays
	can: kvaser_usb: do not increase tx statistics when sending error message frames
	can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_leaf: Get capabilities from device
	can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_leaf: Rename {leaf,usbcan}_cmd_error_event to {leaf,usbcan}_cmd_can_error_event
	can: kvaser_usb: kvaser_usb_leaf: Handle CMD_ERROR_EVENT
	can: kvaser_usb_leaf: Set Warning state even without bus errors
	can: kvaser_usb: make use of units.h in assignment of frequency
	can: kvaser_usb_leaf: Fix improved state not being reported
	can: kvaser_usb_leaf: Fix wrong CAN state after stopping
	can: kvaser_usb_leaf: Fix bogus restart events
	can: kvaser_usb: Add struct kvaser_usb_busparams
	can: kvaser_usb: Compare requested bittiming parameters with actual parameters in do_set_{,data}_bittiming
	drm/rockchip: lvds: fix PM usage counter unbalance in poweron
	clk: renesas: r9a06g032: Repair grave increment error
	spi: Update reference to struct spi_controller
	drm/panel/panel-sitronix-st7701: Remove panel on DSI attach failure
	ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
	drm/msm/hdmi: drop unused GPIO support
	drm/msm/hdmi: use devres helper for runtime PM management
	bpf: Fix slot type check in check_stack_write_var_off
	media: vivid: fix compose size exceed boundary
	media: platform: exynos4-is: fix return value check in fimc_md_probe()
	bpf: propagate precision in ALU/ALU64 operations
	bpf: Check the other end of slot_type for STACK_SPILL
	bpf: propagate precision across all frames, not just the last one
	clk: qcom: gcc-sm8250: Use retention mode for USB GDSCs
	mtd: Fix device name leak when register device failed in add_mtd_device()
	Input: joystick - fix Kconfig warning for JOYSTICK_ADC
	wifi: rsi: Fix handling of 802.3 EAPOL frames sent via control port
	media: camss: Clean up received buffers on failed start of streaming
	net, proc: Provide PROC_FS=n fallback for proc_create_net_single_write()
	rxrpc: Fix ack.bufferSize to be 0 when generating an ack
	bfq: fix waker_bfqq inconsistency crash
	drm/radeon: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
	drm/mediatek: Modify dpi power on/off sequence.
	ASoC: pxa: fix null-pointer dereference in filter()
	libbpf: Fix uninitialized warning in btf_dump_dump_type_data
	nvmet: only allocate a single slab for bvecs
	regulator: core: fix unbalanced of node refcount in regulator_dev_lookup()
	amdgpu/pm: prevent array underflow in vega20_odn_edit_dpm_table()
	nvme: return err on nvme_init_non_mdts_limits fail
	regulator: qcom-rpmh: Fix PMR735a S3 regulator spec
	drm/fourcc: Add packed 10bit YUV 4:2:0 format
	drm/fourcc: Fix vsub/hsub for Q410 and Q401
	integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path
	ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
	block: clear ->slave_dir when dropping the main slave_dir reference
	wifi: ath10k: Fix return value in ath10k_pci_init()
	drm/msm/a6xx: Fix speed-bin detection vs probe-defer
	mtd: lpddr2_nvm: Fix possible null-ptr-deref
	Input: elants_i2c - properly handle the reset GPIO when power is off
	media: vidtv: Fix use-after-free in vidtv_bridge_dvb_init()
	media: solo6x10: fix possible memory leak in solo_sysfs_init()
	media: platform: exynos4-is: Fix error handling in fimc_md_init()
	media: videobuf-dma-contig: use dma_mmap_coherent
	inet: add READ_ONCE(sk->sk_bound_dev_if) in inet_csk_bind_conflict()
	mtd: spi-nor: hide jedec_id sysfs attribute if not present
	mtd: spi-nor: Fix the number of bytes for the dummy cycles
	bpf: Move skb->len == 0 checks into __bpf_redirect
	HID: hid-sensor-custom: set fixed size for custom attributes
	pinctrl: k210: call of_node_put()
	ALSA: pcm: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for SNDRV_PCM_RATE_KNOT
	ALSA: seq: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_USE_EVENT
	regulator: core: use kfree_const() to free space conditionally
	clk: rockchip: Fix memory leak in rockchip_clk_register_pll()
	drm/amdgpu: fix pci device refcount leak
	bonding: fix link recovery in mode 2 when updelay is nonzero
	mtd: maps: pxa2xx-flash: fix memory leak in probe
	drbd: remove call to memset before free device/resource/connection
	drbd: destroy workqueue when drbd device was freed
	ASoC: qcom: Add checks for devm_kcalloc
	media: vimc: Fix wrong function called when vimc_init() fails
	media: imon: fix a race condition in send_packet()
	clk: imx8mn: rename vpu_pll to m7_alt_pll
	clk: imx: replace osc_hdmi with dummy
	clk: imx8mn: fix imx8mn_sai2_sels clocks list
	clk: imx8mn: fix imx8mn_enet_phy_sels clocks list
	pinctrl: pinconf-generic: add missing of_node_put()
	media: dvb-core: Fix ignored return value in dvb_register_frontend()
	media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()
	media: s5p-mfc: Add variant data for MFC v7 hardware for Exynos 3250 SoC
	drm/tegra: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in tegra_dc_probe()
	ASoC: dt-bindings: wcd9335: fix reset line polarity in example
	ASoC: mediatek: mtk-btcvsd: Add checks for write and read of mtk_btcvsd_snd
	NFSv4.2: Clear FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL when done decoding
	NFSv4.2: Fix a memory stomp in decode_attr_security_label
	NFSv4.2: Fix initialisation of struct nfs4_label
	NFSv4: Fix a credential leak in _nfs4_discover_trunking()
	NFSv4: Fix a deadlock between nfs4_open_recover_helper() and delegreturn
	NFS: Fix an Oops in nfs_d_automount()
	ALSA: asihpi: fix missing pci_disable_device()
	wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix double free on tx path.
	ASoC: mediatek: mt8173: Fix debugfs registration for components
	ASoC: mediatek: mt8173: Enable IRQ when pdata is ready
	drm/amd/pm/smu11: BACO is supported when it's in BACO state
	drm/radeon: Fix PCI device refcount leak in radeon_atrm_get_bios()
	drm/amdgpu: Fix PCI device refcount leak in amdgpu_atrm_get_bios()
	drm/amdkfd: Fix memory leakage
	ASoC: pcm512x: Fix PM disable depth imbalance in pcm512x_probe
	netfilter: conntrack: set icmpv6 redirects as RELATED
	Input: wistron_btns - disable on UML
	bpf, sockmap: Fix repeated calls to sock_put() when msg has more_data
	bpf, sockmap: Fix missing BPF_F_INGRESS flag when using apply_bytes
	bpf, sockmap: Fix data loss caused by using apply_bytes on ingress redirect
	bonding: uninitialized variable in bond_miimon_inspect()
	spi: spidev: mask SPI_CS_HIGH in SPI_IOC_RD_MODE
	wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_if_add()
	wifi: cfg80211: Fix not unregister reg_pdev when load_builtin_regdb_keys() fails
	mt76: stop the radar detector after leaving dfs channel
	wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix reporting of TX AGGR histogram
	wifi: mt76: fix coverity overrun-call in mt76_get_txpower()
	regulator: core: fix module refcount leak in set_supply()
	clk: qcom: lpass-sc7180: Fix pm_runtime usage
	clk: qcom: clk-krait: fix wrong div2 functions
	hsr: Add a rcu-read lock to hsr_forward_skb().
	hsr: Avoid double remove of a node.
	hsr: Disable netpoll.
	hsr: Synchronize sending frames to have always incremented outgoing seq nr.
	hsr: Synchronize sequence number updates.
	configfs: fix possible memory leak in configfs_create_dir()
	regulator: core: fix resource leak in regulator_register()
	hwmon: (jc42) Convert register access and caching to regmap/regcache
	hwmon: (jc42) Restore the min/max/critical temperatures on resume
	bpf, sockmap: fix race in sock_map_free()
	ALSA: pcm: Set missing stop_operating flag at undoing trigger start
	media: saa7164: fix missing pci_disable_device()
	ALSA: mts64: fix possible null-ptr-defer in snd_mts64_interrupt
	xprtrdma: Fix regbuf data not freed in rpcrdma_req_create()
	SUNRPC: Fix missing release socket in rpc_sockname()
	NFSv4.x: Fail client initialisation if state manager thread can't run
	riscv, bpf: Emit fixed-length instructions for BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC
	mmc: alcor: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: moxart: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: mxcmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: pxamci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: rtsx_pci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: rtsx_usb_sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: toshsd: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: vub300: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: wmt-sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: atmel-mci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: omap_hsmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: meson-gx: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: via-sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: wbsd: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: mmci: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()
	mmc: renesas_sdhi: alway populate SCC pointer
	memstick: ms_block: Add error handling support for add_disk()
	memstick/ms_block: Add check for alloc_ordered_workqueue
	mmc: core: Normalize the error handling branch in sd_read_ext_regs()
	regulator: qcom-labibb: Fix missing of_node_put() in qcom_labibb_regulator_probe()
	media: c8sectpfe: Add of_node_put() when breaking out of loop
	media: coda: Add check for dcoda_iram_alloc
	media: coda: Add check for kmalloc
	clk: samsung: Fix memory leak in _samsung_clk_register_pll()
	spi: spi-gpio: Don't set MOSI as an input if not 3WIRE mode
	wifi: rtl8xxxu: Add __packed to struct rtl8723bu_c2h
	wifi: rtl8xxxu: Fix the channel width reporting
	wifi: brcmfmac: Fix error return code in brcmf_sdio_download_firmware()
	blktrace: Fix output non-blktrace event when blk_classic option enabled
	bpf: Do not zero-extend kfunc return values
	clk: socfpga: Fix memory leak in socfpga_gate_init()
	net: vmw_vsock: vmci: Check memcpy_from_msg()
	net: defxx: Fix missing err handling in dfx_init()
	net: stmmac: selftests: fix potential memleak in stmmac_test_arpoffload()
	net: stmmac: fix possible memory leak in stmmac_dvr_probe()
	drivers: net: qlcnic: Fix potential memory leak in qlcnic_sriov_init()
	of: overlay: fix null pointer dereferencing in find_dup_cset_node_entry() and find_dup_cset_prop()
	ethernet: s2io: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	net: farsync: Fix kmemleak when rmmods farsync
	net/tunnel: wait until all sk_user_data reader finish before releasing the sock
	net: apple: mace: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	net: apple: bmac: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	net: emaclite: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	net: ethernet: dnet: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	hamradio: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	net: amd: lance: don't call dev_kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	af_unix: call proto_unregister() in the error path in af_unix_init()
	net: amd-xgbe: Fix logic around active and passive cables
	net: amd-xgbe: Check only the minimum speed for active/passive cables
	can: tcan4x5x: Remove invalid write in clear_interrupts
	can: m_can: Call the RAM init directly from m_can_chip_config
	can: tcan4x5x: Fix use of register error status mask
	net: lan9303: Fix read error execution path
	ntb_netdev: Use dev_kfree_skb_any() in interrupt context
	sctp: sysctl: make extra pointers netns aware
	Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix error report for ADD_EXT_ADV_PARAMS
	Bluetooth: btintel: Fix missing free skb in btintel_setup_combined()
	Bluetooth: btusb: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	Bluetooth: hci_qca: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	Bluetooth: hci_ll: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	Bluetooth: hci_h5: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	Bluetooth: hci_bcsp: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	Bluetooth: hci_core: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	Bluetooth: RFCOMM: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	stmmac: fix potential division by 0
	i40e: Fix the inability to attach XDP program on downed interface
	net: dsa: tag_8021q: avoid leaking ctx on dsa_tag_8021q_register() error path
	apparmor: fix a memleak in multi_transaction_new()
	apparmor: fix lockdep warning when removing a namespace
	apparmor: Fix abi check to include v8 abi
	crypto: hisilicon/qm - fix missing destroy qp_idr
	crypto: sun8i-ss - use dma_addr instead u32
	crypto: nitrox - avoid double free on error path in nitrox_sriov_init()
	scsi: core: Fix a race between scsi_done() and scsi_timeout()
	apparmor: Use pointer to struct aa_label for lbs_cred
	PCI: dwc: Fix n_fts[] array overrun
	RDMA/core: Fix order of nldev_exit call
	PCI: pci-epf-test: Register notifier if only core_init_notifier is enabled
	f2fs: Fix the race condition of resize flag between resizefs
	crypto: rockchip - do not do custom power management
	crypto: rockchip - do not store mode globally
	crypto: rockchip - add fallback for cipher
	crypto: rockchip - add fallback for ahash
	crypto: rockchip - better handle cipher key
	crypto: rockchip - remove non-aligned handling
	crypto: rockchip - rework by using crypto_engine
	apparmor: Fix memleak in alloc_ns()
	f2fs: fix to invalidate dcc->f2fs_issue_discard in error path
	f2fs: fix normal discard process
	f2fs: fix to destroy sbi->post_read_wq in error path of f2fs_fill_super()
	RDMA/irdma: Report the correct link speed
	scsi: qla2xxx: Fix set-but-not-used variable warnings
	RDMA/siw: Fix immediate work request flush to completion queue
	IB/mad: Don't call to function that might sleep while in atomic context
	PCI: vmd: Disable MSI remapping after suspend
	RDMA/restrack: Release MR restrack when delete
	RDMA/core: Make sure "ib_port" is valid when access sysfs node
	RDMA/nldev: Return "-EAGAIN" if the cm_id isn't from expected port
	RDMA/siw: Set defined status for work completion with undefined status
	scsi: scsi_debug: Fix a warning in resp_write_scat()
	crypto: ccree - Remove debugfs when platform_driver_register failed
	crypto: cryptd - Use request context instead of stack for sub-request
	crypto: hisilicon/qm - add missing pci_dev_put() in q_num_set()
	RDMA/hns: Repacing 'dseg_len' by macros in fill_ext_sge_inl_data()
	RDMA/hns: Fix ext_sge num error when post send
	PCI: Check for alloc failure in pci_request_irq()
	RDMA/hfi: Decrease PCI device reference count in error path
	crypto: ccree - Make cc_debugfs_global_fini() available for module init function
	RDMA/hns: fix memory leak in hns_roce_alloc_mr()
	RDMA/rxe: Fix NULL-ptr-deref in rxe_qp_do_cleanup() when socket create failed
	dt-bindings: imx6q-pcie: Fix clock names for imx6sx and imx8mq
	dt-bindings: visconti-pcie: Fix interrupts array max constraints
	scsi: hpsa: Fix possible memory leak in hpsa_init_one()
	crypto: tcrypt - Fix multibuffer skcipher speed test mem leak
	padata: Always leave BHs disabled when running ->parallel()
	padata: Fix list iterator in padata_do_serial()
	scsi: mpt3sas: Fix possible resource leaks in mpt3sas_transport_port_add()
	scsi: hpsa: Fix error handling in hpsa_add_sas_host()
	scsi: hpsa: Fix possible memory leak in hpsa_add_sas_device()
	scsi: efct: Fix possible memleak in efct_device_init()
	scsi: scsi_debug: Fix a warning in resp_verify()
	scsi: scsi_debug: Fix a warning in resp_report_zones()
	scsi: fcoe: Fix possible name leak when device_register() fails
	scsi: scsi_debug: Fix possible name leak in sdebug_add_host_helper()
	scsi: ipr: Fix WARNING in ipr_init()
	scsi: fcoe: Fix transport not deattached when fcoe_if_init() fails
	scsi: snic: Fix possible UAF in snic_tgt_create()
	RDMA/nldev: Add checks for nla_nest_start() in fill_stat_counter_qps()
	f2fs: avoid victim selection from previous victim section
	RDMA/nldev: Fix failure to send large messages
	crypto: amlogic - Remove kcalloc without check
	crypto: omap-sham - Use pm_runtime_resume_and_get() in omap_sham_probe()
	riscv/mm: add arch hook arch_clear_hugepage_flags
	RDMA/hfi1: Fix error return code in parse_platform_config()
	RDMA/srp: Fix error return code in srp_parse_options()
	PCI: mt7621: Rename mt7621_pci_ to mt7621_pcie_
	PCI: mt7621: Add sentinel to quirks table
	orangefs: Fix sysfs not cleanup when dev init failed
	RDMA/hns: Fix AH attr queried by query_qp
	RDMA/hns: Fix PBL page MTR find
	RDMA/hns: Fix page size cap from firmware
	RDMA/hns: Fix error code of CMD
	crypto: img-hash - Fix variable dereferenced before check 'hdev->req'
	hwrng: amd - Fix PCI device refcount leak
	hwrng: geode - Fix PCI device refcount leak
	IB/IPoIB: Fix queue count inconsistency for PKEY child interfaces
	RISC-V: Align the shadow stack
	drivers: dio: fix possible memory leak in dio_init()
	serial: tegra: Read DMA status before terminating
	serial: 8250_bcm7271: Fix error handling in brcmuart_init()
	class: fix possible memory leak in __class_register()
	vfio: platform: Do not pass return buffer to ACPI _RST method
	uio: uio_dmem_genirq: Fix missing unlock in irq configuration
	uio: uio_dmem_genirq: Fix deadlock between irq config and handling
	usb: fotg210-udc: Fix ages old endianness issues
	staging: vme_user: Fix possible UAF in tsi148_dma_list_add
	usb: typec: Check for ops->exit instead of ops->enter in altmode_exit
	usb: typec: tcpci: fix of node refcount leak in tcpci_register_port()
	usb: typec: tipd: Cleanup resources if devm_tps6598_psy_register fails
	usb: typec: tipd: Fix spurious fwnode_handle_put in error path
	extcon: usbc-tusb320: Add support for mode setting and reset
	extcon: usbc-tusb320: Add support for TUSB320L
	usb: typec: Factor out non-PD fwnode properties
	extcon: usbc-tusb320: Factor out extcon into dedicated functions
	extcon: usbc-tusb320: Add USB TYPE-C support
	extcon: usbc-tusb320: Update state on probe even if no IRQ pending
	serial: amba-pl011: avoid SBSA UART accessing DMACR register
	serial: pl011: Do not clear RX FIFO & RX interrupt in unthrottle.
	serial: stm32: move dma_request_chan() before clk_prepare_enable()
	serial: pch: Fix PCI device refcount leak in pch_request_dma()
	tty: serial: clean up stop-tx part in altera_uart_tx_chars()
	tty: serial: altera_uart_{r,t}x_chars() need only uart_port
	serial: altera_uart: fix locking in polling mode
	serial: sunsab: Fix error handling in sunsab_init()
	test_firmware: fix memory leak in test_firmware_init()
	misc: ocxl: fix possible name leak in ocxl_file_register_afu()
	ocxl: fix pci device refcount leak when calling get_function_0()
	misc: tifm: fix possible memory leak in tifm_7xx1_switch_media()
	misc: sgi-gru: fix use-after-free error in gru_set_context_option, gru_fault and gru_handle_user_call_os
	firmware: raspberrypi: fix possible memory leak in rpi_firmware_probe()
	cxl: fix possible null-ptr-deref in cxl_guest_init_afu|adapter()
	cxl: fix possible null-ptr-deref in cxl_pci_init_afu|adapter()
	iio: temperature: ltc2983: make bulk write buffer DMA-safe
	iio: adis: handle devices that cannot unmask the drdy pin
	iio: adis: stylistic changes
	iio:imu:adis: Move exports into IIO_ADISLIB namespace
	iio: adis: add '__adis_enable_irq()' implementation
	counter: stm32-lptimer-cnt: fix the check on arr and cmp registers update
	coresight: trbe: remove cpuhp instance node before remove cpuhp state
	usb: roles: fix of node refcount leak in usb_role_switch_is_parent()
	usb: gadget: f_hid: fix f_hidg lifetime vs cdev
	usb: gadget: f_hid: fix refcount leak on error path
	drivers: mcb: fix resource leak in mcb_probe()
	mcb: mcb-parse: fix error handing in chameleon_parse_gdd()
	chardev: fix error handling in cdev_device_add()
	i2c: pxa-pci: fix missing pci_disable_device() on error in ce4100_i2c_probe
	staging: rtl8192u: Fix use after free in ieee80211_rx()
	staging: rtl8192e: Fix potential use-after-free in rtllib_rx_Monitor()
	vme: Fix error not catched in fake_init()
	gpiolib: Get rid of redundant 'else'
	gpiolib: cdev: fix NULL-pointer dereferences
	gpiolib: make struct comments into real kernel docs
	gpiolib: protect the GPIO device against being dropped while in use by user-space
	i2c: mux: reg: check return value after calling platform_get_resource()
	i2c: ismt: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in ismt_access()
	usb: storage: Add check for kcalloc
	tracing/hist: Fix issue of losting command info in error_log
	ksmbd: Fix resource leak in ksmbd_session_rpc_open()
	samples: vfio-mdev: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in mdpy_fb_probe()
	thermal/drivers/imx8mm_thermal: Validate temperature range
	thermal/drivers/qcom/temp-alarm: Fix inaccurate warning for gen2
	thermal/drivers/qcom/lmh: Fix irq handler return value
	fbdev: ssd1307fb: Drop optional dependency
	fbdev: pm2fb: fix missing pci_disable_device()
	fbdev: via: Fix error in via_core_init()
	fbdev: vermilion: decrease reference count in error path
	fbdev: ep93xx-fb: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in ep93xxfb_probe()
	fbdev: geode: don't build on UML
	fbdev: uvesafb: don't build on UML
	fbdev: uvesafb: Fixes an error handling path in uvesafb_probe()
	HSI: omap_ssi_core: fix unbalanced pm_runtime_disable()
	HSI: omap_ssi_core: fix possible memory leak in ssi_probe()
	power: supply: fix residue sysfs file in error handle route of __power_supply_register()
	perf trace: Return error if a system call doesn't exist
	perf trace: Use macro RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM to replace number
	perf trace: Handle failure when trace point folder is missed
	perf symbol: correction while adjusting symbol
	power: supply: z2_battery: Fix possible memleak in z2_batt_probe()
	HSI: omap_ssi_core: Fix error handling in ssi_init()
	power: supply: ab8500: Fix error handling in ab8500_charger_init()
	power: supply: fix null pointer dereferencing in power_supply_get_battery_info
	perf stat: Refactor __run_perf_stat() common code
	perf stat: Do not delay the workload with --delay
	RDMA/siw: Fix pointer cast warning
	fs/ntfs3: Avoid UBSAN error on true_sectors_per_clst()
	overflow: Implement size_t saturating arithmetic helpers
	fs/ntfs3: Harden against integer overflows
	iommu/sun50i: Fix reset release
	iommu/sun50i: Consider all fault sources for reset
	iommu/sun50i: Fix R/W permission check
	iommu/sun50i: Fix flush size
	iommu/rockchip: fix permission bits in page table entries v2
	phy: usb: s2 WoL wakeup_count not incremented for USB->Eth devices
	include/uapi/linux/swab: Fix potentially missing __always_inline
	pwm: tegra: Improve required rate calculation
	fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ntfs_trim_fs
	dmaengine: idxd: Fix crc_val field for completion record
	rtc: rtc-cmos: Do not check ACPI_FADT_LOW_POWER_S0
	rtc: cmos: Fix event handler registration ordering issue
	rtc: cmos: Fix wake alarm breakage
	rtc: cmos: fix build on non-ACPI platforms
	rtc: cmos: Call cmos_wake_setup() from cmos_do_probe()
	rtc: cmos: Call rtc_wake_setup() from cmos_do_probe()
	rtc: cmos: Eliminate forward declarations of some functions
	rtc: cmos: Rename ACPI-related functions
	rtc: cmos: Disable ACPI RTC event on removal
	rtc: snvs: Allow a time difference on clock register read
	rtc: pcf85063: Fix reading alarm
	iommu/amd: Fix pci device refcount leak in ppr_notifier()
	iommu/fsl_pamu: Fix resource leak in fsl_pamu_probe()
	macintosh: fix possible memory leak in macio_add_one_device()
	macintosh/macio-adb: check the return value of ioremap()
	powerpc/52xx: Fix a resource leak in an error handling path
	cxl: Fix refcount leak in cxl_calc_capp_routing
	powerpc/xmon: Fix -Wswitch-unreachable warning in bpt_cmds
	powerpc/xive: add missing iounmap() in error path in xive_spapr_populate_irq_data()
	powerpc/perf: callchain validate kernel stack pointer bounds
	powerpc/83xx/mpc832x_rdb: call platform_device_put() in error case in of_fsl_spi_probe()
	powerpc/hv-gpci: Fix hv_gpci event list
	selftests/powerpc: Fix resource leaks
	iommu/sun50i: Remove IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY
	pwm: sifive: Call pwm_sifive_update_clock() while mutex is held
	pwm: mtk-disp: Fix the parameters calculated by the enabled flag of disp_pwm
	pwm: mediatek: always use bus clock for PWM on MT7622
	remoteproc: sysmon: fix memory leak in qcom_add_sysmon_subdev()
	remoteproc: qcom: q6v5: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in q6v5_wcss_init_mmio()
	remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: disable wakeup on probe fail or remove
	remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: detach power domains on remove
	remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: Fix missing of_node_put() in adsp_alloc_memory_region()
	remoteproc: qcom: q6v5: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() in q6v5_wcss_qcs404_power_on()
	powerpc/eeh: Drop redundant spinlock initialization
	powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size
	mfd: bd957x: Fix Kconfig dependency on REGMAP_IRQ
	mfd: qcom_rpm: Fix an error handling path in qcom_rpm_probe()
	mfd: pm8008: Remove driver data structure pm8008_data
	mfd: pm8008: Fix return value check in pm8008_probe()
	netfilter: flowtable: really fix NAT IPv6 offload
	rtc: st-lpc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in st_rtc_probe()
	rtc: pic32: Move devm_rtc_allocate_device earlier in pic32_rtc_probe()
	rtc: pcf85063: fix pcf85063_clkout_control
	nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure
	net: macsec: fix net device access prior to holding a lock
	mISDN: hfcsusb: don't call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	mISDN: hfcpci: don't call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	mISDN: hfcmulti: don't call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
	block, bfq: fix possible uaf for 'bfqq->bic'
	selftests/bpf: Add test for unstable CT lookup API
	net: enetc: avoid buffer leaks on xdp_do_redirect() failure
	nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used
	unix: Fix race in SOCK_SEQPACKET's unix_dgram_sendmsg()
	r6040: Fix kmemleak in probe and remove
	igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit
	igc: Use strict cycles for Qbv scheduling
	igc: Add checking for basetime less than zero
	igc: allow BaseTime 0 enrollment for Qbv
	igc: recalculate Qbv end_time by considering cycle time
	igc: Lift TAPRIO schedule restriction
	igc: Set Qbv start_time and end_time to end_time if not being configured in GCL
	rtc: mxc_v2: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare()
	selftests: devlink: fix the fd redirect in dummy_reporter_test
	openvswitch: Fix flow lookup to use unmasked key
	soc: mediatek: pm-domains: Fix the power glitch issue
	arm64: dts: mt8183: Fix Mali GPU clock
	skbuff: Account for tail adjustment during pull operations
	mailbox: mpfs: read the system controller's status
	mailbox: arm_mhuv2: Fix return value check in mhuv2_probe()
	mailbox: zynq-ipi: fix error handling while device_register() fails
	net_sched: reject TCF_EM_SIMPLE case for complex ematch module
	rxrpc: Fix missing unlock in rxrpc_do_sendmsg()
	myri10ge: Fix an error handling path in myri10ge_probe()
	net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()
	HID: amd_sfh: Add missing check for dma_alloc_coherent
	rcu: Fix __this_cpu_read() lockdep warning in rcu_force_quiescent_state()
	arm64: make is_ttbrX_addr() noinstr-safe
	video: hyperv_fb: Avoid taking busy spinlock on panic path
	x86/hyperv: Remove unregister syscore call from Hyper-V cleanup
	binfmt_misc: fix shift-out-of-bounds in check_special_flags
	fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG
	udf: Avoid double brelse() in udf_rename()
	jfs: Fix fortify moan in symlink
	fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbDiscardAG
	ACPICA: Fix error code path in acpi_ds_call_control_method()
	nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds/overflow in nilfs_sb2_bad_offset()
	nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds due to too large exponent of block size
	acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()
	hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find
	drm/etnaviv: add missing quirks for GC300
	media: imx-jpeg: Disable useless interrupt to avoid kernel panic
	brcmfmac: return error when getting invalid max_flowrings from dongle
	wifi: ath9k: verify the expected usb_endpoints are present
	wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out
	ASoC: codecs: rt298: Add quirk for KBL-R RVP platform
	ipmi: fix memleak when unload ipmi driver
	drm/amd/display: prevent memory leak
	Revert "drm/amd/display: Limit max DSC target bpp for specific monitors"
	qed (gcc13): use u16 for fid to be big enough
	bpf: make sure skb->len != 0 when redirecting to a tunneling device
	net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()
	hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()
	wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()
	igb: Do not free q_vector unless new one was allocated
	drm/amdgpu: Fix type of second parameter in trans_msg() callback
	drm/amdgpu: Fix type of second parameter in odn_edit_dpm_table() callback
	s390/ctcm: Fix return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx()
	s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()
	s390/lcs: Fix return type of lcs_start_xmit()
	drm/msm: Use drm_mode_copy()
	drm/rockchip: Use drm_mode_copy()
	drm/sti: Use drm_mode_copy()
	drm/mediatek: Fix return type of mtk_hdmi_bridge_mode_valid()
	drivers/md/md-bitmap: check the return value of md_bitmap_get_counter()
	md/raid1: stop mdx_raid1 thread when raid1 array run failed
	drm/amd/display: fix array index out of bound error in bios parser
	net: add atomic_long_t to net_device_stats fields
	ipv6/sit: use DEV_STATS_INC() to avoid data-races
	mrp: introduce active flags to prevent UAF when applicant uninit
	ppp: associate skb with a device at tx
	bpf: Prevent decl_tag from being referenced in func_proto arg
	ethtool: avoiding integer overflow in ethtool_phys_id()
	media: dvb-frontends: fix leak of memory fw
	media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF
	media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init()
	blk-mq: fix possible memleak when register 'hctx' failed
	drm/amd/display: Use the largest vready_offset in pipe group
	libbpf: Avoid enum forward-declarations in public API in C++ mode
	regulator: core: fix use_count leakage when handling boot-on
	wifi: mt76: do not run mt76u_status_worker if the device is not running
	mmc: f-sdh30: Add quirks for broken timeout clock capability
	mmc: renesas_sdhi: better reset from HS400 mode
	media: si470x: Fix use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback()
	clk: st: Fix memory leak in st_of_quadfs_setup()
	crypto: hisilicon/hpre - fix resource leak in remove process
	scsi: lpfc: Fix hard lockup when reading the rx_monitor from debugfs
	scsi: ufs: Reduce the START STOP UNIT timeout
	scsi: elx: libefc: Fix second parameter type in state callbacks
	hugetlbfs: fix null-ptr-deref in hugetlbfs_parse_param()
	drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
	drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
	orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string()
	orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_{kernel,client}_debug_init()
	tools/include: Add _RET_IP_ and math definitions to kernel.h
	KVM: selftests: Fix build regression by using accessor function
	hwmon: (jc42) Fix missing unlock on error in jc42_write()
	ALSA/ASoC: hda: move/rename snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams to hdac_stream.c
	ALSA: hda: add snd_hdac_stop_streams() helper
	ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Fix driver hang during shutdown
	ASoC: mediatek: mt8173-rt5650-rt5514: fix refcount leak in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe()
	ASoC: audio-graph-card: fix refcount leak of cpu_ep in __graph_for_each_link()
	ASoC: rockchip: pdm: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume()
	ASoC: mediatek: mt8183: fix refcount leak in mt8183_mt6358_ts3a227_max98357_dev_probe()
	ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock
	ASoC: rockchip: spdif: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rk_spdif_runtime_resume()
	ASoC: rt5670: Remove unbalanced pm_runtime_put()
	drm/i915/display: Don't disable DDI/Transcoder when setting phy test pattern
	LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks
	pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion
	perf debug: Set debug_peo_args and redirect_to_stderr variable to correct values in perf_quiet_option()
	afs: Fix lost servers_outstanding count
	pstore: Make sure CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG selects CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
	ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule
	ALSA: usb-audio: add the quirk for KT0206 device
	ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Lenovo TianYi510Pro-14IOB
	ALSA: hda/hdmi: Add HP Device 0x8711 to force connect list
	usb: cdnsp: fix lack of ZLP for ep0
	usb: xhci-mtk: fix leakage of shared hcd when fail to set wakeup irq
	arm64: dts: qcom: sm8250: fix USB-DP PHY registers
	usb: dwc3: Fix race between dwc3_set_mode and __dwc3_set_mode
	usb: dwc3: core: defer probe on ulpi_read_id timeout
	xhci: Prevent infinite loop in transaction errors recovery for streams
	HID: wacom: Ensure bootloader PID is usable in hidraw mode
	HID: mcp2221: don't connect hidraw
	loop: Fix the max_loop commandline argument treatment when it is set to 0
	9p: set req refcount to zero to avoid uninitialized usage
	security: Restrict CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to gcc or clang > 15.0.6
	reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
	iio: fix memory leak in iio_device_register_eventset()
	iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: do not use internal iio_dev lock
	iio: adc128s052: add proper .data members in adc128_of_match table
	regulator: core: fix deadlock on regulator enable
	floppy: Fix memory leak in do_floppy_init()
	gcov: add support for checksum field
	fbdev: fbcon: release buffer when fbcon_do_set_font() failed
	ovl: fix use inode directly in rcu-walk mode
	btrfs: do not BUG_ON() on ENOMEM when dropping extent items for a range
	scsi: qla2xxx: Fix crash when I/O abort times out
	net: stmmac: fix errno when create_singlethread_workqueue() fails
	media: dvbdev: fix build warning due to comments
	media: dvbdev: fix refcnt bug
	extcon: usbc-tusb320: Call the Type-C IRQ handler only if a port is registered
	mfd: qcom_rpm: Use devm_of_platform_populate() to simplify code
	pwm: tegra: Fix 32 bit build
	Linux 5.15.86

Change-Id: Ic157edd6a65abf4a3167b5d227edeb0564f1be4e
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2023-01-18 12:52:16 +00:00

4285 lines
117 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Fast Userspace Mutexes (which I call "Futexes!").
* (C) Rusty Russell, IBM 2002
*
* Generalized futexes, futex requeueing, misc fixes by Ingo Molnar
* (C) Copyright 2003 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
*
* Removed page pinning, fix privately mapped COW pages and other cleanups
* (C) Copyright 2003, 2004 Jamie Lokier
*
* Robust futex support started by Ingo Molnar
* (C) Copyright 2006 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for suggestions, analysis and fixes.
*
* PI-futex support started by Ingo Molnar and Thomas Gleixner
* Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
* Copyright (C) 2006 Timesys Corp., Thomas Gleixner <tglx@timesys.com>
*
* PRIVATE futexes by Eric Dumazet
* Copyright (C) 2007 Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
*
* Requeue-PI support by Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2009
* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for conceptual design and careful reviews.
*
* Thanks to Ben LaHaise for yelling "hashed waitqueues" loudly
* enough at me, Linus for the original (flawed) idea, Matthew
* Kirkwood for proof-of-concept implementation.
*
* "The futexes are also cursed."
* "But they come in a choice of three flavours!"
*/
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/jhash.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/fault-inject.h>
#include <linux/time_namespace.h>
#include <asm/futex.h>
#include "../locking/rtmutex_common.h"
#include <trace/hooks/futex.h>
/*
* READ this before attempting to hack on futexes!
*
* Basic futex operation and ordering guarantees
* =============================================
*
* The waiter reads the futex value in user space and calls
* futex_wait(). This function computes the hash bucket and acquires
* the hash bucket lock. After that it reads the futex user space value
* again and verifies that the data has not changed. If it has not changed
* it enqueues itself into the hash bucket, releases the hash bucket lock
* and schedules.
*
* The waker side modifies the user space value of the futex and calls
* futex_wake(). This function computes the hash bucket and acquires the
* hash bucket lock. Then it looks for waiters on that futex in the hash
* bucket and wakes them.
*
* In futex wake up scenarios where no tasks are blocked on a futex, taking
* the hb spinlock can be avoided and simply return. In order for this
* optimization to work, ordering guarantees must exist so that the waiter
* being added to the list is acknowledged when the list is concurrently being
* checked by the waker, avoiding scenarios like the following:
*
* CPU 0 CPU 1
* val = *futex;
* sys_futex(WAIT, futex, val);
* futex_wait(futex, val);
* uval = *futex;
* *futex = newval;
* sys_futex(WAKE, futex);
* futex_wake(futex);
* if (queue_empty())
* return;
* if (uval == val)
* lock(hash_bucket(futex));
* queue();
* unlock(hash_bucket(futex));
* schedule();
*
* This would cause the waiter on CPU 0 to wait forever because it
* missed the transition of the user space value from val to newval
* and the waker did not find the waiter in the hash bucket queue.
*
* The correct serialization ensures that a waiter either observes
* the changed user space value before blocking or is woken by a
* concurrent waker:
*
* CPU 0 CPU 1
* val = *futex;
* sys_futex(WAIT, futex, val);
* futex_wait(futex, val);
*
* waiters++; (a)
* smp_mb(); (A) <-- paired with -.
* |
* lock(hash_bucket(futex)); |
* |
* uval = *futex; |
* | *futex = newval;
* | sys_futex(WAKE, futex);
* | futex_wake(futex);
* |
* `--------> smp_mb(); (B)
* if (uval == val)
* queue();
* unlock(hash_bucket(futex));
* schedule(); if (waiters)
* lock(hash_bucket(futex));
* else wake_waiters(futex);
* waiters--; (b) unlock(hash_bucket(futex));
*
* Where (A) orders the waiters increment and the futex value read through
* atomic operations (see hb_waiters_inc) and where (B) orders the write
* to futex and the waiters read (see hb_waiters_pending()).
*
* This yields the following case (where X:=waiters, Y:=futex):
*
* X = Y = 0
*
* w[X]=1 w[Y]=1
* MB MB
* r[Y]=y r[X]=x
*
* Which guarantees that x==0 && y==0 is impossible; which translates back into
* the guarantee that we cannot both miss the futex variable change and the
* enqueue.
*
* Note that a new waiter is accounted for in (a) even when it is possible that
* the wait call can return error, in which case we backtrack from it in (b).
* Refer to the comment in queue_lock().
*
* Similarly, in order to account for waiters being requeued on another
* address we always increment the waiters for the destination bucket before
* acquiring the lock. It then decrements them again after releasing it -
* the code that actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets (requeue_futex)
* will do the additional required waiter count housekeeping. This is done for
* double_lock_hb() and double_unlock_hb(), respectively.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
#define futex_cmpxchg_enabled 1
#else
static int __read_mostly futex_cmpxchg_enabled;
#endif
/*
* Futex flags used to encode options to functions and preserve them across
* restarts.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
# define FLAGS_SHARED 0x01
#else
/*
* NOMMU does not have per process address space. Let the compiler optimize
* code away.
*/
# define FLAGS_SHARED 0x00
#endif
#define FLAGS_CLOCKRT 0x02
#define FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT 0x04
/*
* Priority Inheritance state:
*/
struct futex_pi_state {
/*
* list of 'owned' pi_state instances - these have to be
* cleaned up in do_exit() if the task exits prematurely:
*/
struct list_head list;
/*
* The PI object:
*/
struct rt_mutex_base pi_mutex;
struct task_struct *owner;
refcount_t refcount;
union futex_key key;
} __randomize_layout;
/**
* struct futex_q - The hashed futex queue entry, one per waiting task
* @list: priority-sorted list of tasks waiting on this futex
* @task: the task waiting on the futex
* @lock_ptr: the hash bucket lock
* @key: the key the futex is hashed on
* @pi_state: optional priority inheritance state
* @rt_waiter: rt_waiter storage for use with requeue_pi
* @requeue_pi_key: the requeue_pi target futex key
* @bitset: bitset for the optional bitmasked wakeup
* @requeue_state: State field for futex_requeue_pi()
* @requeue_wait: RCU wait for futex_requeue_pi() (RT only)
*
* We use this hashed waitqueue, instead of a normal wait_queue_entry_t, so
* we can wake only the relevant ones (hashed queues may be shared).
*
* A futex_q has a woken state, just like tasks have TASK_RUNNING.
* It is considered woken when plist_node_empty(&q->list) || q->lock_ptr == 0.
* The order of wakeup is always to make the first condition true, then
* the second.
*
* PI futexes are typically woken before they are removed from the hash list via
* the rt_mutex code. See unqueue_me_pi().
*/
struct futex_q {
struct plist_node list;
struct task_struct *task;
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
union futex_key key;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
struct rt_mutex_waiter *rt_waiter;
union futex_key *requeue_pi_key;
u32 bitset;
atomic_t requeue_state;
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
struct rcuwait requeue_wait;
#endif
} __randomize_layout;
/*
* On PREEMPT_RT, the hash bucket lock is a 'sleeping' spinlock with an
* underlying rtmutex. The task which is about to be requeued could have
* just woken up (timeout, signal). After the wake up the task has to
* acquire hash bucket lock, which is held by the requeue code. As a task
* can only be blocked on _ONE_ rtmutex at a time, the proxy lock blocking
* and the hash bucket lock blocking would collide and corrupt state.
*
* On !PREEMPT_RT this is not a problem and everything could be serialized
* on hash bucket lock, but aside of having the benefit of common code,
* this allows to avoid doing the requeue when the task is already on the
* way out and taking the hash bucket lock of the original uaddr1 when the
* requeue has been completed.
*
* The following state transitions are valid:
*
* On the waiter side:
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT
*
* On the requeue side:
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_INPROGRESS
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_DONE/LOCKED
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE (requeue failed)
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_DONE/LOCKED
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE (requeue failed)
*
* The requeue side ignores a waiter with state Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE as this
* signals that the waiter is already on the way out. It also means that
* the waiter is still on the 'wait' futex, i.e. uaddr1.
*
* The waiter side signals early wakeup to the requeue side either through
* setting state to Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE or to Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT depending
* on the current state. In case of Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE it can immediately
* proceed to take the hash bucket lock of uaddr1. If it set state to WAIT,
* which means the wakeup is interleaving with a requeue in progress it has
* to wait for the requeue side to change the state. Either to DONE/LOCKED
* or to IGNORE. DONE/LOCKED means the waiter q is now on the uaddr2 futex
* and either blocked (DONE) or has acquired it (LOCKED). IGNORE is set by
* the requeue side when the requeue attempt failed via deadlock detection
* and therefore the waiter q is still on the uaddr1 futex.
*/
enum {
Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE = 0,
Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE,
Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS,
Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT,
Q_REQUEUE_PI_DONE,
Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED,
};
static const struct futex_q futex_q_init = {
/* list gets initialized in queue_me()*/
.key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT,
.bitset = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY,
.requeue_state = ATOMIC_INIT(Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE),
};
/*
* Hash buckets are shared by all the futex_keys that hash to the same
* location. Each key may have multiple futex_q structures, one for each task
* waiting on a futex.
*/
struct futex_hash_bucket {
atomic_t waiters;
spinlock_t lock;
struct plist_head chain;
} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
/*
* The base of the bucket array and its size are always used together
* (after initialization only in hash_futex()), so ensure that they
* reside in the same cacheline.
*/
static struct {
struct futex_hash_bucket *queues;
unsigned long hashsize;
} __futex_data __read_mostly __aligned(2*sizeof(long));
#define futex_queues (__futex_data.queues)
#define futex_hashsize (__futex_data.hashsize)
/*
* Fault injections for futexes.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX
static struct {
struct fault_attr attr;
bool ignore_private;
} fail_futex = {
.attr = FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER,
.ignore_private = false,
};
static int __init setup_fail_futex(char *str)
{
return setup_fault_attr(&fail_futex.attr, str);
}
__setup("fail_futex=", setup_fail_futex);
static bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
{
if (fail_futex.ignore_private && !fshared)
return false;
return should_fail(&fail_futex.attr, 1);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS
static int __init fail_futex_debugfs(void)
{
umode_t mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
struct dentry *dir;
dir = fault_create_debugfs_attr("fail_futex", NULL,
&fail_futex.attr);
if (IS_ERR(dir))
return PTR_ERR(dir);
debugfs_create_bool("ignore-private", mode, dir,
&fail_futex.ignore_private);
return 0;
}
late_initcall(fail_futex_debugfs);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS */
#else
static inline bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
{
return false;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX */
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
#endif
/*
* Reflects a new waiter being added to the waitqueue.
*/
static inline void hb_waiters_inc(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
atomic_inc(&hb->waiters);
/*
* Full barrier (A), see the ordering comment above.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
#endif
}
/*
* Reflects a waiter being removed from the waitqueue by wakeup
* paths.
*/
static inline void hb_waiters_dec(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
atomic_dec(&hb->waiters);
#endif
}
static inline int hb_waiters_pending(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Full barrier (B), see the ordering comment above.
*/
smp_mb();
return atomic_read(&hb->waiters);
#else
return 1;
#endif
}
/**
* hash_futex - Return the hash bucket in the global hash
* @key: Pointer to the futex key for which the hash is calculated
*
* We hash on the keys returned from get_futex_key (see below) and return the
* corresponding hash bucket in the global hash.
*/
static struct futex_hash_bucket *hash_futex(union futex_key *key)
{
u32 hash = jhash2((u32 *)key, offsetof(typeof(*key), both.offset) / 4,
key->both.offset);
return &futex_queues[hash & (futex_hashsize - 1)];
}
/**
* match_futex - Check whether two futex keys are equal
* @key1: Pointer to key1
* @key2: Pointer to key2
*
* Return 1 if two futex_keys are equal, 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline int match_futex(union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2)
{
return (key1 && key2
&& key1->both.word == key2->both.word
&& key1->both.ptr == key2->both.ptr
&& key1->both.offset == key2->both.offset);
}
enum futex_access {
FUTEX_READ,
FUTEX_WRITE
};
/**
* futex_setup_timer - set up the sleeping hrtimer.
* @time: ptr to the given timeout value
* @timeout: the hrtimer_sleeper structure to be set up
* @flags: futex flags
* @range_ns: optional range in ns
*
* Return: Initialized hrtimer_sleeper structure or NULL if no timeout
* value given
*/
static inline struct hrtimer_sleeper *
futex_setup_timer(ktime_t *time, struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout,
int flags, u64 range_ns)
{
if (!time)
return NULL;
hrtimer_init_sleeper_on_stack(timeout, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
/*
* If range_ns is 0, calling hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns() is
* effectively the same as calling hrtimer_set_expires().
*/
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&timeout->timer, *time, range_ns);
return timeout;
}
/*
* Generate a machine wide unique identifier for this inode.
*
* This relies on u64 not wrapping in the life-time of the machine; which with
* 1ns resolution means almost 585 years.
*
* This further relies on the fact that a well formed program will not unmap
* the file while it has a (shared) futex waiting on it. This mapping will have
* a file reference which pins the mount and inode.
*
* If for some reason an inode gets evicted and read back in again, it will get
* a new sequence number and will _NOT_ match, even though it is the exact same
* file.
*
* It is important that match_futex() will never have a false-positive, esp.
* for PI futexes that can mess up the state. The above argues that false-negatives
* are only possible for malformed programs.
*/
static u64 get_inode_sequence_number(struct inode *inode)
{
static atomic64_t i_seq;
u64 old;
/* Does the inode already have a sequence number? */
old = atomic64_read(&inode->i_sequence);
if (likely(old))
return old;
for (;;) {
u64 new = atomic64_add_return(1, &i_seq);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new))
continue;
old = atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(&inode->i_sequence, 0, new);
if (old)
return old;
return new;
}
}
/**
* get_futex_key() - Get parameters which are the keys for a futex
* @uaddr: virtual address of the futex
* @fshared: false for a PROCESS_PRIVATE futex, true for PROCESS_SHARED
* @key: address where result is stored.
* @rw: mapping needs to be read/write (values: FUTEX_READ,
* FUTEX_WRITE)
*
* Return: a negative error code or 0
*
* The key words are stored in @key on success.
*
* For shared mappings (when @fshared), the key is:
*
* ( inode->i_sequence, page->index, offset_within_page )
*
* [ also see get_inode_sequence_number() ]
*
* For private mappings (or when !@fshared), the key is:
*
* ( current->mm, address, 0 )
*
* This allows (cross process, where applicable) identification of the futex
* without keeping the page pinned for the duration of the FUTEX_WAIT.
*
* lock_page() might sleep, the caller should not hold a spinlock.
*/
static int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, bool fshared, union futex_key *key,
enum futex_access rw)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct page *page, *tail;
struct address_space *mapping;
int err, ro = 0;
/*
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
*/
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
*/
if (!fshared) {
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
return 0;
}
again:
/* Ignore any VERIFY_READ mapping (futex common case) */
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page);
/*
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
* and get read-only access.
*/
if (err == -EFAULT && rw == FUTEX_READ) {
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
ro = 1;
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
else
err = 0;
/*
* The treatment of mapping from this point on is critical. The page
* lock protects many things but in this context the page lock
* stabilizes mapping, prevents inode freeing in the shared
* file-backed region case and guards against movement to swap cache.
*
* Strictly speaking the page lock is not needed in all cases being
* considered here and page lock forces unnecessarily serialization
* From this point on, mapping will be re-verified if necessary and
* page lock will be acquired only if it is unavoidable
*
* Mapping checks require the head page for any compound page so the
* head page and mapping is looked up now. For anonymous pages, it
* does not matter if the page splits in the future as the key is
* based on the address. For filesystem-backed pages, the tail is
* required as the index of the page determines the key. For
* base pages, there is no tail page and tail == page.
*/
tail = page;
page = compound_head(page);
mapping = READ_ONCE(page->mapping);
/*
* If page->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
* so refcount care in invalidate_complete_page's remove_mapping
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
*
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page->mapping.
*/
if (unlikely(!mapping)) {
int shmem_swizzled;
/*
* Page lock is required to identify which special case above
* applies. If this is really a shmem page then the page lock
* will prevent unexpected transitions.
*/
lock_page(page);
shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page) || page->mapping;
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (shmem_swizzled)
goto again;
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
*
* If the futex key is stored on an anonymous page, then the associated
* object is the mm which is implicitly pinned by the calling process.
*
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
* the object not the particular process.
*/
if (PageAnon(page)) {
/*
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
* sense for futex operations.
*/
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)) || ro) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
} else {
struct inode *inode;
/*
* The associated futex object in this case is the inode and
* the page->mapping must be traversed. Ordinarily this should
* be stabilised under page lock but it's not strictly
* necessary in this case as we just want to pin the inode, not
* update the radix tree or anything like that.
*
* The RCU read lock is taken as the inode is finally freed
* under RCU. If the mapping still matches expectations then the
* mapping->host can be safely accessed as being a valid inode.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
if (READ_ONCE(page->mapping) != mapping) {
rcu_read_unlock();
put_page(page);
goto again;
}
inode = READ_ONCE(mapping->host);
if (!inode) {
rcu_read_unlock();
put_page(page);
goto again;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
key->shared.i_seq = get_inode_sequence_number(inode);
key->shared.pgoff = page_to_pgoff(tail);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
out:
put_page(page);
return err;
}
/**
* fault_in_user_writeable() - Fault in user address and verify RW access
* @uaddr: pointer to faulting user space address
*
* Slow path to fixup the fault we just took in the atomic write
* access to @uaddr.
*
* We have no generic implementation of a non-destructive write to the
* user address. We know that we faulted in the atomic pagefault
* disabled section so we can as well avoid the #PF overhead by
* calling get_user_pages() right away.
*/
static int fault_in_user_writeable(u32 __user *uaddr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int ret;
mmap_read_lock(mm);
ret = fixup_user_fault(mm, (unsigned long)uaddr,
FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, NULL);
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
}
/**
* futex_top_waiter() - Return the highest priority waiter on a futex
* @hb: the hash bucket the futex_q's reside in
* @key: the futex key (to distinguish it from other futex futex_q's)
*
* Must be called with the hb lock held.
*/
static struct futex_q *futex_top_waiter(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
union futex_key *key)
{
struct futex_q *this;
plist_for_each_entry(this, &hb->chain, list) {
if (match_futex(&this->key, key))
return this;
}
return NULL;
}
static int cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(u32 *curval, u32 __user *uaddr,
u32 uval, u32 newval)
{
int ret;
pagefault_disable();
ret = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
pagefault_enable();
return ret;
}
static int get_futex_value_locked(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from)
{
int ret;
pagefault_disable();
ret = __get_user(*dest, from);
pagefault_enable();
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
/*
* PI code:
*/
static int refill_pi_state_cache(void)
{
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
if (likely(current->pi_state_cache))
return 0;
pi_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*pi_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pi_state)
return -ENOMEM;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pi_state->list);
/* pi_mutex gets initialized later */
pi_state->owner = NULL;
refcount_set(&pi_state->refcount, 1);
pi_state->key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
current->pi_state_cache = pi_state;
return 0;
}
static struct futex_pi_state *alloc_pi_state(void)
{
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = current->pi_state_cache;
WARN_ON(!pi_state);
current->pi_state_cache = NULL;
return pi_state;
}
static void pi_state_update_owner(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
struct task_struct *new_owner)
{
struct task_struct *old_owner = pi_state->owner;
lockdep_assert_held(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
if (old_owner) {
raw_spin_lock(&old_owner->pi_lock);
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
raw_spin_unlock(&old_owner->pi_lock);
}
if (new_owner) {
raw_spin_lock(&new_owner->pi_lock);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pi_state->list));
list_add(&pi_state->list, &new_owner->pi_state_list);
pi_state->owner = new_owner;
raw_spin_unlock(&new_owner->pi_lock);
}
}
static void get_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount));
}
/*
* Drops a reference to the pi_state object and frees or caches it
* when the last reference is gone.
*/
static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
{
if (!pi_state)
return;
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&pi_state->refcount))
return;
/*
* If pi_state->owner is NULL, the owner is most probably dying
* and has cleaned up the pi_state already
*/
if (pi_state->owner) {
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, NULL);
rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
}
if (current->pi_state_cache) {
kfree(pi_state);
} else {
/*
* pi_state->list is already empty.
* clear pi_state->owner.
* refcount is at 0 - put it back to 1.
*/
pi_state->owner = NULL;
refcount_set(&pi_state->refcount, 1);
current->pi_state_cache = pi_state;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_PI
/*
* This task is holding PI mutexes at exit time => bad.
* Kernel cleans up PI-state, but userspace is likely hosed.
* (Robust-futex cleanup is separate and might save the day for userspace.)
*/
static void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
* pi_state_list anymore, but we have to be careful
* versus waiters unqueueing themselves:
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
while (!list_empty(head)) {
next = head->next;
pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list);
key = pi_state->key;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
/*
* We can race against put_pi_state() removing itself from the
* list (a waiter going away). put_pi_state() will first
* decrement the reference count and then modify the list, so
* its possible to see the list entry but fail this reference
* acquire.
*
* In that case; drop the locks to let put_pi_state() make
* progress and retry the loop.
*/
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount)) {
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
cpu_relax();
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
continue;
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
raw_spin_lock(&curr->pi_lock);
/*
* We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this
* task still owns the PI-state:
*/
if (head->next != next) {
/* retain curr->pi_lock for the loop invariant */
raw_spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_pi_state(pi_state);
continue;
}
WARN_ON(pi_state->owner != curr);
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
pi_state->owner = NULL;
raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
put_pi_state(pi_state);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
}
#else
static inline void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) { }
#endif
/*
* We need to check the following states:
*
* Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ?
*
* [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid
* [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid
*
* [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid
*
* [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid
* [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid
*
* [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid
*
* [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid
*
* [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid
* [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid
* [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid
*
* [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
* came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.
*
* [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
* thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.
*
* [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex
*
* [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
* value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
*
* [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
* and exit_pi_state_list()
*
* [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
* the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.
*
* [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.
*
* [8] Owner and user space value match
*
* [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
* except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
* FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]
*
* [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
* TID out of sync. Except one error case where the kernel is denied
* write access to the user address, see fixup_pi_state_owner().
*
*
* Serialization and lifetime rules:
*
* hb->lock:
*
* hb -> futex_q, relation
* futex_q -> pi_state, relation
*
* (cannot be raw because hb can contain arbitrary amount
* of futex_q's)
*
* pi_mutex->wait_lock:
*
* {uval, pi_state}
*
* (and pi_mutex 'obviously')
*
* p->pi_lock:
*
* p->pi_state_list -> pi_state->list, relation
* pi_mutex->owner -> pi_state->owner, relation
*
* pi_state->refcount:
*
* pi_state lifetime
*
*
* Lock order:
*
* hb->lock
* pi_mutex->wait_lock
* p->pi_lock
*
*/
/*
* Validate that the existing waiter has a pi_state and sanity check
* the pi_state against the user space value. If correct, attach to
* it.
*/
static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
struct futex_pi_state **ps)
{
pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
u32 uval2;
int ret;
/*
* Userspace might have messed up non-PI and PI futexes [3]
*/
if (unlikely(!pi_state))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* We get here with hb->lock held, and having found a
* futex_top_waiter(). This means that futex_lock_pi() of said futex_q
* has dropped the hb->lock in between queue_me() and unqueue_me_pi(),
* which in turn means that futex_lock_pi() still has a reference on
* our pi_state.
*
* The waiter holding a reference on @pi_state also protects against
* the unlocked put_pi_state() in futex_unlock_pi(), futex_lock_pi()
* and futex_wait_requeue_pi() as it cannot go to 0 and consequently
* free pi_state before we can take a reference ourselves.
*/
WARN_ON(!refcount_read(&pi_state->refcount));
/*
* Now that we have a pi_state, we can acquire wait_lock
* and do the state validation.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
/*
* Since {uval, pi_state} is serialized by wait_lock, and our current
* uval was read without holding it, it can have changed. Verify it
* still is what we expect it to be, otherwise retry the entire
* operation.
*/
if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval2, uaddr))
goto out_efault;
if (uval != uval2)
goto out_eagain;
/*
* Handle the owner died case:
*/
if (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
/*
* exit_pi_state_list sets owner to NULL and wakes the
* topmost waiter. The task which acquires the
* pi_state->rt_mutex will fixup owner.
*/
if (!pi_state->owner) {
/*
* No pi state owner, but the user space TID
* is not 0. Inconsistent state. [5]
*/
if (pid)
goto out_einval;
/*
* Take a ref on the state and return success. [4]
*/
goto out_attach;
}
/*
* If TID is 0, then either the dying owner has not
* yet executed exit_pi_state_list() or some waiter
* acquired the rtmutex in the pi state, but did not
* yet fixup the TID in user space.
*
* Take a ref on the state and return success. [6]
*/
if (!pid)
goto out_attach;
} else {
/*
* If the owner died bit is not set, then the pi_state
* must have an owner. [7]
*/
if (!pi_state->owner)
goto out_einval;
}
/*
* Bail out if user space manipulated the futex value. If pi
* state exists then the owner TID must be the same as the
* user space TID. [9/10]
*/
if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner))
goto out_einval;
out_attach:
get_pi_state(pi_state);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
*ps = pi_state;
return 0;
out_einval:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_error;
out_eagain:
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out_error;
out_efault:
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_error;
out_error:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
return ret;
}
/**
* wait_for_owner_exiting - Block until the owner has exited
* @ret: owner's current futex lock status
* @exiting: Pointer to the exiting task
*
* Caller must hold a refcount on @exiting.
*/
static void wait_for_owner_exiting(int ret, struct task_struct *exiting)
{
if (ret != -EBUSY) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting);
return;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EBUSY && !exiting))
return;
mutex_lock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
/*
* No point in doing state checking here. If the waiter got here
* while the task was in exec()->exec_futex_release() then it can
* have any FUTEX_STATE_* value when the waiter has acquired the
* mutex. OK, if running, EXITING or DEAD if it reached exit()
* already. Highly unlikely and not a problem. Just one more round
* through the futex maze.
*/
mutex_unlock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
put_task_struct(exiting);
}
static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
u32 uval2;
/*
* If the futex exit state is not yet FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, tell the
* caller that the alleged owner is busy.
*/
if (tsk && tsk->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
return -EBUSY;
/*
* Reread the user space value to handle the following situation:
*
* CPU0 CPU1
*
* sys_exit() sys_futex()
* do_exit() futex_lock_pi()
* futex_lock_pi_atomic()
* exit_signals(tsk) No waiters:
* tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING; *uaddr == 0x00000PID
* mm_release(tsk) Set waiter bit
* exit_robust_list(tsk) { *uaddr = 0x80000PID;
* Set owner died attach_to_pi_owner() {
* *uaddr = 0xC0000000; tsk = get_task(PID);
* } if (!tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) {
* ... attach();
* tsk->futex_state = } else {
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD; if (tsk->futex_state !=
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
* return -EAGAIN;
* return -ESRCH; <--- FAIL
* }
*
* Returning ESRCH unconditionally is wrong here because the
* user space value has been changed by the exiting task.
*
* The same logic applies to the case where the exiting task is
* already gone.
*/
if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval2, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/* If the user space value has changed, try again. */
if (uval2 != uval)
return -EAGAIN;
/*
* The exiting task did not have a robust list, the robust list was
* corrupted or the user space value in *uaddr is simply bogus.
* Give up and tell user space.
*/
return -ESRCH;
}
static void __attach_to_pi_owner(struct task_struct *p, union futex_key *key,
struct futex_pi_state **ps)
{
/*
* No existing pi state. First waiter. [2]
*
* This creates pi_state, we have hb->lock held, this means nothing can
* observe this state, wait_lock is irrelevant.
*/
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = alloc_pi_state();
/*
* Initialize the pi_mutex in locked state and make @p
* the owner of it:
*/
rt_mutex_init_proxy_locked(&pi_state->pi_mutex, p);
/* Store the key for possible exit cleanups: */
pi_state->key = *key;
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pi_state->list));
list_add(&pi_state->list, &p->pi_state_list);
/*
* Assignment without holding pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock is safe
* because there is no concurrency as the object is not published yet.
*/
pi_state->owner = p;
*ps = pi_state;
}
/*
* Lookup the task for the TID provided from user space and attach to
* it after doing proper sanity checks.
*/
static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct **exiting)
{
pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
struct task_struct *p;
/*
* We are the first waiter - try to look up the real owner and attach
* the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0 [1]
*
* The !pid check is paranoid. None of the call sites should end up
* with pid == 0, but better safe than sorry. Let the caller retry
*/
if (!pid)
return -EAGAIN;
p = find_get_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
return handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, NULL);
if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
put_task_struct(p);
return -EPERM;
}
/*
* We need to look at the task state to figure out, whether the
* task is exiting. To protect against the change of the task state
* in futex_exit_release(), we do this protected by p->pi_lock:
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
if (unlikely(p->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_OK)) {
/*
* The task is on the way out. When the futex state is
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, we know that the task has finished
* the cleanup:
*/
int ret = handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, p);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
/*
* If the owner task is between FUTEX_STATE_EXITING and
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD then store the task pointer and keep
* the reference on the task struct. The calling code will
* drop all locks, wait for the task to reach
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD and then drop the refcount. This is
* required to prevent a live lock when the current task
* preempted the exiting task between the two states.
*/
if (ret == -EBUSY)
*exiting = p;
else
put_task_struct(p);
return ret;
}
__attach_to_pi_owner(p, key, ps);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
put_task_struct(p);
return 0;
}
static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
{
int err;
u32 curval;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
}
/**
* futex_lock_pi_atomic() - Atomic work required to acquire a pi aware futex
* @uaddr: the pi futex user address
* @hb: the pi futex hash bucket
* @key: the futex key associated with uaddr and hb
* @ps: the pi_state pointer where we store the result of the
* lookup
* @task: the task to perform the atomic lock work for. This will
* be "current" except in the case of requeue pi.
* @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task
* which is in the middle of exiting
* @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0)
*
* Return:
* - 0 - ready to wait;
* - 1 - acquired the lock;
* - <0 - error
*
* The hb->lock must be held by the caller.
*
* @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds
* a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it
* after waiting for the exit to complete.
*/
static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
union futex_key *key,
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct *task,
struct task_struct **exiting,
int set_waiters)
{
u32 uval, newval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(task);
struct futex_q *top_waiter;
int ret;
/*
* Read the user space value first so we can validate a few
* things before proceeding further.
*/
if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Detect deadlocks.
*/
if ((unlikely((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == vpid)))
return -EDEADLK;
if ((unlikely(should_fail_futex(true))))
return -EDEADLK;
/*
* Lookup existing state first. If it exists, try to attach to
* its pi_state.
*/
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, key);
if (top_waiter)
return attach_to_pi_state(uaddr, uval, top_waiter->pi_state, ps);
/*
* No waiter and user TID is 0. We are here because the
* waiters or the owner died bit is set or called from
* requeue_cmp_pi or for whatever reason something took the
* syscall.
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK)) {
/*
* We take over the futex. No other waiters and the user space
* TID is 0. We preserve the owner died bit.
*/
newval = uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
newval |= vpid;
/* The futex requeue_pi code can enforce the waiters bit */
if (set_waiters)
newval |= FUTEX_WAITERS;
ret = lock_pi_update_atomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* If the waiter bit was requested the caller also needs PI
* state attached to the new owner of the user space futex.
*
* @task is guaranteed to be alive and it cannot be exiting
* because it is either sleeping or waiting in
* futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync().
*
* No need to do the full attach_to_pi_owner() exercise
* because @task is known and valid.
*/
if (set_waiters) {
raw_spin_lock_irq(&task->pi_lock);
__attach_to_pi_owner(task, key, ps);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&task->pi_lock);
}
return 1;
}
/*
* First waiter. Set the waiters bit before attaching ourself to
* the owner. If owner tries to unlock, it will be forced into
* the kernel and blocked on hb->lock.
*/
newval = uval | FUTEX_WAITERS;
ret = lock_pi_update_atomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* If the update of the user space value succeeded, we try to
* attach to the owner. If that fails, no harm done, we only
* set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in the user space variable.
*/
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps, exiting);
}
/**
* __unqueue_futex() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
*
* The q->lock_ptr must not be NULL and must be held by the caller.
*/
static void __unqueue_futex(struct futex_q *q)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
if (WARN_ON_SMP(!q->lock_ptr) || WARN_ON(plist_node_empty(&q->list)))
return;
lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
hb = container_of(q->lock_ptr, struct futex_hash_bucket, lock);
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
hb_waiters_dec(hb);
}
/*
* The hash bucket lock must be held when this is called.
* Afterwards, the futex_q must not be accessed. Callers
* must ensure to later call wake_up_q() for the actual
* wakeups to occur.
*/
static void mark_wake_futex(struct wake_q_head *wake_q, struct futex_q *q)
{
struct task_struct *p = q->task;
if (WARN(q->pi_state || q->rt_waiter, "refusing to wake PI futex\n"))
return;
get_task_struct(p);
__unqueue_futex(q);
/*
* The waiting task can free the futex_q as soon as q->lock_ptr = NULL
* is written, without taking any locks. This is possible in the event
* of a spurious wakeup, for example. A memory barrier is required here
* to prevent the following store to lock_ptr from getting ahead of the
* plist_del in __unqueue_futex().
*/
smp_store_release(&q->lock_ptr, NULL);
/*
* Queue the task for later wakeup for after we've released
* the hb->lock.
*/
wake_q_add_safe(wake_q, p);
}
/*
* Caller must hold a reference on @pi_state.
*/
static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
{
struct rt_mutex_waiter *top_waiter;
struct task_struct *new_owner;
bool postunlock = false;
DEFINE_RT_WAKE_Q(wqh);
u32 curval, newval;
int ret = 0;
top_waiter = rt_mutex_top_waiter(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!top_waiter)) {
/*
* As per the comment in futex_unlock_pi() this should not happen.
*
* When this happens, give up our locks and try again, giving
* the futex_lock_pi() instance time to complete, either by
* waiting on the rtmutex or removing itself from the futex
* queue.
*/
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
new_owner = top_waiter->task;
/*
* We pass it to the next owner. The WAITERS bit is always kept
* enabled while there is PI state around. We cleanup the owner
* died bit, because we are the owner.
*/
newval = FUTEX_WAITERS | task_pid_vnr(new_owner);
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
if (!ret && (curval != uval)) {
/*
* If a unconditional UNLOCK_PI operation (user space did not
* try the TID->0 transition) raced with a waiter setting the
* FUTEX_WAITERS flag between get_user() and locking the hash
* bucket lock, retry the operation.
*/
if ((FUTEX_TID_MASK & curval) == uval)
ret = -EAGAIN;
else
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (!ret) {
/*
* This is a point of no return; once we modified the uval
* there is no going back and subsequent operations must
* not fail.
*/
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, new_owner);
postunlock = __rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, &wqh);
}
out_unlock:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
if (postunlock)
rt_mutex_postunlock(&wqh);
return ret;
}
/*
* Express the locking dependencies for lockdep:
*/
static inline void
double_lock_hb(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2)
{
if (hb1 <= hb2) {
spin_lock(&hb1->lock);
if (hb1 < hb2)
spin_lock_nested(&hb2->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
} else { /* hb1 > hb2 */
spin_lock(&hb2->lock);
spin_lock_nested(&hb1->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
}
}
static inline void
double_unlock_hb(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2)
{
spin_unlock(&hb1->lock);
if (hb1 != hb2)
spin_unlock(&hb2->lock);
}
/*
* Wake up waiters matching bitset queued on this futex (uaddr).
*/
static int
futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int ret;
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
/* Make sure we really have tasks to wakeup */
if (!hb_waiters_pending(hb))
return ret;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) {
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Check if one of the bits is set in both bitsets */
if (!(this->bitset & bitset))
continue;
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
return ret;
}
static int futex_atomic_op_inuser(unsigned int encoded_op, u32 __user *uaddr)
{
unsigned int op = (encoded_op & 0x70000000) >> 28;
unsigned int cmp = (encoded_op & 0x0f000000) >> 24;
int oparg = sign_extend32((encoded_op & 0x00fff000) >> 12, 11);
int cmparg = sign_extend32(encoded_op & 0x00000fff, 11);
int oldval, ret;
if (encoded_op & (FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT << 28)) {
if (oparg < 0 || oparg > 31) {
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
/*
* kill this print and return -EINVAL when userspace
* is sane again
*/
pr_info_ratelimited("futex_wake_op: %s tries to shift op by %d; fix this program\n",
get_task_comm(comm, current), oparg);
oparg &= 31;
}
oparg = 1 << oparg;
}
pagefault_disable();
ret = arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, oparg, &oldval, uaddr);
pagefault_enable();
if (ret)
return ret;
switch (cmp) {
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ:
return oldval == cmparg;
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_NE:
return oldval != cmparg;
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_LT:
return oldval < cmparg;
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_GE:
return oldval >= cmparg;
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_LE:
return oldval <= cmparg;
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_GT:
return oldval > cmparg;
default:
return -ENOSYS;
}
}
/*
* Wake up all waiters hashed on the physical page that is mapped
* to this virtual address:
*/
static int
futex_wake_op(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags, u32 __user *uaddr2,
int nr_wake, int nr_wake2, int op)
{
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
int ret, op_ret;
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
retry_private:
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) ||
unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT && op_ret != -EAGAIN)) {
/*
* we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have
* an MMU, but we might get them from range checking
*/
ret = op_ret;
return ret;
}
if (op_ret == -EFAULT) {
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
cond_resched();
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
goto retry_private;
goto retry;
}
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb1->chain, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key1)) {
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
break;
}
}
if (op_ret > 0) {
op_ret = 0;
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb2->chain, list) {
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key2)) {
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
if (++op_ret >= nr_wake2)
break;
}
}
ret += op_ret;
}
out_unlock:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
return ret;
}
/**
* requeue_futex() - Requeue a futex_q from one hb to another
* @q: the futex_q to requeue
* @hb1: the source hash_bucket
* @hb2: the target hash_bucket
* @key2: the new key for the requeued futex_q
*/
static inline
void requeue_futex(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, union futex_key *key2)
{
/*
* If key1 and key2 hash to the same bucket, no need to
* requeue.
*/
if (likely(&hb1->chain != &hb2->chain)) {
plist_del(&q->list, &hb1->chain);
hb_waiters_dec(hb1);
hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
plist_add(&q->list, &hb2->chain);
q->lock_ptr = &hb2->lock;
}
q->key = *key2;
}
static inline bool futex_requeue_pi_prepare(struct futex_q *q,
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
{
int old, new;
/*
* Set state to Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS unless an early wakeup has
* already set Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE to signal that requeue should
* ignore the waiter.
*/
old = atomic_read_acquire(&q->requeue_state);
do {
if (old == Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE)
return false;
/*
* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() might have set it to
* IN_PROGRESS and a interleaved early wake to WAIT.
*
* It was considered to have an extra state for that
* trylock, but that would just add more conditionals
* all over the place for a dubious value.
*/
if (old != Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE)
break;
new = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS;
} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&q->requeue_state, &old, new));
q->pi_state = pi_state;
return true;
}
static inline void futex_requeue_pi_complete(struct futex_q *q, int locked)
{
int old, new;
old = atomic_read_acquire(&q->requeue_state);
do {
if (old == Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE)
return;
if (locked >= 0) {
/* Requeue succeeded. Set DONE or LOCKED */
WARN_ON_ONCE(old != Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS &&
old != Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT);
new = Q_REQUEUE_PI_DONE + locked;
} else if (old == Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS) {
/* Deadlock, no early wakeup interleave */
new = Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE;
} else {
/* Deadlock, early wakeup interleave. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(old != Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT);
new = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE;
}
} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&q->requeue_state, &old, new));
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
/* If the waiter interleaved with the requeue let it know */
if (unlikely(old == Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT))
rcuwait_wake_up(&q->requeue_wait);
#endif
}
static inline int futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync(struct futex_q *q)
{
int old, new;
old = atomic_read_acquire(&q->requeue_state);
do {
/* Is requeue done already? */
if (old >= Q_REQUEUE_PI_DONE)
return old;
/*
* If not done, then tell the requeue code to either ignore
* the waiter or to wake it up once the requeue is done.
*/
new = Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT;
if (old == Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE)
new = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE;
} while (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&q->requeue_state, &old, new));
/* If the requeue was in progress, wait for it to complete */
if (old == Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
rcuwait_wait_event(&q->requeue_wait,
atomic_read(&q->requeue_state) != Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
#else
(void)atomic_cond_read_relaxed(&q->requeue_state, VAL != Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT);
#endif
}
/*
* Requeue is now either prohibited or complete. Reread state
* because during the wait above it might have changed. Nothing
* will modify q->requeue_state after this point.
*/
return atomic_read(&q->requeue_state);
}
/**
* requeue_pi_wake_futex() - Wake a task that acquired the lock during requeue
* @q: the futex_q
* @key: the key of the requeue target futex
* @hb: the hash_bucket of the requeue target futex
*
* During futex_requeue, with requeue_pi=1, it is possible to acquire the
* target futex if it is uncontended or via a lock steal.
*
* 1) Set @q::key to the requeue target futex key so the waiter can detect
* the wakeup on the right futex.
*
* 2) Dequeue @q from the hash bucket.
*
* 3) Set @q::rt_waiter to NULL so the woken up task can detect atomic lock
* acquisition.
*
* 4) Set the q->lock_ptr to the requeue target hb->lock for the case that
* the waiter has to fixup the pi state.
*
* 5) Complete the requeue state so the waiter can make progress. After
* this point the waiter task can return from the syscall immediately in
* case that the pi state does not have to be fixed up.
*
* 6) Wake the waiter task.
*
* Must be called with both q->lock_ptr and hb->lock held.
*/
static inline
void requeue_pi_wake_futex(struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
q->key = *key;
__unqueue_futex(q);
WARN_ON(!q->rt_waiter);
q->rt_waiter = NULL;
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
/* Signal locked state to the waiter */
futex_requeue_pi_complete(q, 1);
wake_up_state(q->task, TASK_NORMAL);
}
/**
* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() - Attempt an atomic lock for the top waiter
* @pifutex: the user address of the to futex
* @hb1: the from futex hash bucket, must be locked by the caller
* @hb2: the to futex hash bucket, must be locked by the caller
* @key1: the from futex key
* @key2: the to futex key
* @ps: address to store the pi_state pointer
* @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task
* which is in the middle of exiting
* @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0)
*
* Try and get the lock on behalf of the top waiter if we can do it atomically.
* Wake the top waiter if we succeed. If the caller specified set_waiters,
* then direct futex_lock_pi_atomic() to force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit.
* hb1 and hb2 must be held by the caller.
*
* @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds
* a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it
* after waiting for the exit to complete.
*
* Return:
* - 0 - failed to acquire the lock atomically;
* - >0 - acquired the lock, return value is vpid of the top_waiter
* - <0 - error
*/
static int
futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, union futex_key *key1,
union futex_key *key2, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
struct task_struct **exiting, int set_waiters)
{
struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL;
u32 curval;
int ret;
if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, pifutex))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Find the top_waiter and determine if there are additional waiters.
* If the caller intends to requeue more than 1 waiter to pifutex,
* force futex_lock_pi_atomic() to set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit now,
* as we have means to handle the possible fault. If not, don't set
* the bit unnecessarily as it will force the subsequent unlock to enter
* the kernel.
*/
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb1, key1);
/* There are no waiters, nothing for us to do. */
if (!top_waiter)
return 0;
/*
* Ensure that this is a waiter sitting in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
* and waiting on the 'waitqueue' futex which is always !PI.
*/
if (!top_waiter->rt_waiter || top_waiter->pi_state)
return -EINVAL;
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex. */
if (!match_futex(top_waiter->requeue_pi_key, key2))
return -EINVAL;
/* Ensure that this does not race against an early wakeup */
if (!futex_requeue_pi_prepare(top_waiter, NULL))
return -EAGAIN;
/*
* Try to take the lock for top_waiter and set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit
* in the contended case or if @set_waiters is true.
*
* In the contended case PI state is attached to the lock owner. If
* the user space lock can be acquired then PI state is attached to
* the new owner (@top_waiter->task) when @set_waiters is true.
*/
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task,
exiting, set_waiters);
if (ret == 1) {
/*
* Lock was acquired in user space and PI state was
* attached to @top_waiter->task. That means state is fully
* consistent and the waiter can return to user space
* immediately after the wakeup.
*/
requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2);
} else if (ret < 0) {
/* Rewind top_waiter::requeue_state */
futex_requeue_pi_complete(top_waiter, ret);
} else {
/*
* futex_lock_pi_atomic() did not acquire the user space
* futex, but managed to establish the proxy lock and pi
* state. top_waiter::requeue_state cannot be fixed up here
* because the waiter is not enqueued on the rtmutex
* yet. This is handled at the callsite depending on the
* result of rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() which is
* guaranteed to be reached with this function returning 0.
*/
}
return ret;
}
/**
* futex_requeue() - Requeue waiters from uaddr1 to uaddr2
* @uaddr1: source futex user address
* @flags: futex flags (FLAGS_SHARED, etc.)
* @uaddr2: target futex user address
* @nr_wake: number of waiters to wake (must be 1 for requeue_pi)
* @nr_requeue: number of waiters to requeue (0-INT_MAX)
* @cmpval: @uaddr1 expected value (or %NULL)
* @requeue_pi: if we are attempting to requeue from a non-pi futex to a
* pi futex (pi to pi requeue is not supported)
*
* Requeue waiters on uaddr1 to uaddr2. In the requeue_pi case, try to acquire
* uaddr2 atomically on behalf of the top waiter.
*
* Return:
* - >=0 - on success, the number of tasks requeued or woken;
* - <0 - on error
*/
static int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags,
u32 __user *uaddr2, int nr_wake, int nr_requeue,
u32 *cmpval, int requeue_pi)
{
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int task_count = 0, ret;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
if (nr_wake < 0 || nr_requeue < 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* When PI not supported: return -ENOSYS if requeue_pi is true,
* consequently the compiler knows requeue_pi is always false past
* this point which will optimize away all the conditional code
* further down.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI) && requeue_pi)
return -ENOSYS;
if (requeue_pi) {
/*
* Requeue PI only works on two distinct uaddrs. This
* check is only valid for private futexes. See below.
*/
if (uaddr1 == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* futex_requeue() allows the caller to define the number
* of waiters to wake up via the @nr_wake argument. With
* REQUEUE_PI, waking up more than one waiter is creating
* more problems than it solves. Waking up a waiter makes
* only sense if the PI futex @uaddr2 is uncontended as
* this allows the requeue code to acquire the futex
* @uaddr2 before waking the waiter. The waiter can then
* return to user space without further action. A secondary
* wakeup would just make the futex_wait_requeue_pi()
* handling more complex, because that code would have to
* look up pi_state and do more or less all the handling
* which the requeue code has to do for the to be requeued
* waiters. So restrict the number of waiters to wake to
* one, and only wake it up when the PI futex is
* uncontended. Otherwise requeue it and let the unlock of
* the PI futex handle the wakeup.
*
* All REQUEUE_PI users, e.g. pthread_cond_signal() and
* pthread_cond_broadcast() must use nr_wake=1.
*/
if (nr_wake != 1)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* requeue_pi requires a pi_state, try to allocate it now
* without any locks in case it fails.
*/
if (refill_pi_state_cache())
return -ENOMEM;
}
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2,
requeue_pi ? FUTEX_WRITE : FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
/*
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
*/
if (requeue_pi && match_futex(&key1, &key2))
return -EINVAL;
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
retry_private:
hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
if (likely(cmpval != NULL)) {
u32 curval;
ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr1);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
ret = get_user(curval, uaddr1);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
goto retry_private;
goto retry;
}
if (curval != *cmpval) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (requeue_pi) {
struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
/*
* Attempt to acquire uaddr2 and wake the top waiter. If we
* intend to requeue waiters, force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS
* bit. We force this here where we are able to easily handle
* faults rather in the requeue loop below.
*
* Updates topwaiter::requeue_state if a top waiter exists.
*/
ret = futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(uaddr2, hb1, hb2, &key1,
&key2, &pi_state,
&exiting, nr_requeue);
/*
* At this point the top_waiter has either taken uaddr2 or
* is waiting on it. In both cases pi_state has been
* established and an initial refcount on it. In case of an
* error there's nothing.
*
* The top waiter's requeue_state is up to date:
*
* - If the lock was acquired atomically (ret == 1), then
* the state is Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED.
*
* The top waiter has been dequeued and woken up and can
* return to user space immediately. The kernel/user
* space state is consistent. In case that there must be
* more waiters requeued the WAITERS bit in the user
* space futex is set so the top waiter task has to go
* into the syscall slowpath to unlock the futex. This
* will block until this requeue operation has been
* completed and the hash bucket locks have been
* dropped.
*
* - If the trylock failed with an error (ret < 0) then
* the state is either Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE, i.e. "nothing
* happened", or Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE when there was an
* interleaved early wakeup.
*
* - If the trylock did not succeed (ret == 0) then the
* state is either Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS or
* Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT if an early wakeup interleaved.
* This will be cleaned up in the loop below, which
* cannot fail because futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() did
* the same sanity checks for requeue_pi as the loop
* below does.
*/
switch (ret) {
case 0:
/* We hold a reference on the pi state. */
break;
case 1:
/*
* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() acquired the user space
* futex. Adjust task_count.
*/
task_count++;
ret = 0;
break;
/*
* If the above failed, then pi_state is NULL and
* waiter::requeue_state is correct.
*/
case -EFAULT:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
case -EBUSY:
case -EAGAIN:
/*
* Two reasons for this:
* - EBUSY: Owner is exiting and we just wait for the
* exit to complete.
* - EAGAIN: The user space value changed.
*/
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
/*
* Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of
* exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise
* this task might loop forever, aka. live lock.
*/
wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting);
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
goto out_unlock;
}
}
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb1->chain, list) {
if (task_count - nr_wake >= nr_requeue)
break;
if (!match_futex(&this->key, &key1))
continue;
/*
* FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI and FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI should always
* be paired with each other and no other futex ops.
*
* We should never be requeueing a futex_q with a pi_state,
* which is awaiting a futex_unlock_pi().
*/
if ((requeue_pi && !this->rt_waiter) ||
(!requeue_pi && this->rt_waiter) ||
this->pi_state) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Plain futexes just wake or requeue and are done */
if (!requeue_pi) {
if (++task_count <= nr_wake)
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
else
requeue_futex(this, hb1, hb2, &key2);
continue;
}
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex for requeue_pi. */
if (!match_futex(this->requeue_pi_key, &key2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* Requeue nr_requeue waiters and possibly one more in the case
* of requeue_pi if we couldn't acquire the lock atomically.
*
* Prepare the waiter to take the rt_mutex. Take a refcount
* on the pi_state and store the pointer in the futex_q
* object of the waiter.
*/
get_pi_state(pi_state);
/* Don't requeue when the waiter is already on the way out. */
if (!futex_requeue_pi_prepare(this, pi_state)) {
/*
* Early woken waiter signaled that it is on the
* way out. Drop the pi_state reference and try the
* next waiter. @this->pi_state is still NULL.
*/
put_pi_state(pi_state);
continue;
}
ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex,
this->rt_waiter,
this->task);
if (ret == 1) {
/*
* We got the lock. We do neither drop the refcount
* on pi_state nor clear this->pi_state because the
* waiter needs the pi_state for cleaning up the
* user space value. It will drop the refcount
* after doing so. this::requeue_state is updated
* in the wakeup as well.
*/
requeue_pi_wake_futex(this, &key2, hb2);
task_count++;
} else if (!ret) {
/* Waiter is queued, move it to hb2 */
requeue_futex(this, hb1, hb2, &key2);
futex_requeue_pi_complete(this, 0);
task_count++;
} else {
/*
* rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() detected a potential
* deadlock when we tried to queue that waiter.
* Drop the pi_state reference which we took above
* and remove the pointer to the state from the
* waiters futex_q object.
*/
this->pi_state = NULL;
put_pi_state(pi_state);
futex_requeue_pi_complete(this, ret);
/*
* We stop queueing more waiters and let user space
* deal with the mess.
*/
break;
}
}
/*
* We took an extra initial reference to the pi_state in
* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(). We need to drop it here again.
*/
put_pi_state(pi_state);
out_unlock:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
return ret ? ret : task_count;
}
/* The key must be already stored in q->key. */
static inline struct futex_hash_bucket *queue_lock(struct futex_q *q)
__acquires(&hb->lock)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
hb = hash_futex(&q->key);
/*
* Increment the counter before taking the lock so that
* a potential waker won't miss a to-be-slept task that is
* waiting for the spinlock. This is safe as all queue_lock()
* users end up calling queue_me(). Similarly, for housekeeping,
* decrement the counter at queue_unlock() when some error has
* occurred and we don't end up adding the task to the list.
*/
hb_waiters_inc(hb); /* implies smp_mb(); (A) */
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
return hb;
}
static inline void
queue_unlock(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
__releases(&hb->lock)
{
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
hb_waiters_dec(hb);
}
static inline void __queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
int prio;
bool already_on_hb = false;
/*
* The priority used to register this element is
* - either the real thread-priority for the real-time threads
* (i.e. threads with a priority lower than MAX_RT_PRIO)
* - or MAX_RT_PRIO for non-RT threads.
* Thus, all RT-threads are woken first in priority order, and
* the others are woken last, in FIFO order.
*/
prio = min(current->normal_prio, MAX_RT_PRIO);
plist_node_init(&q->list, prio);
trace_android_vh_alter_futex_plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain, &already_on_hb);
if (!already_on_hb)
plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain);
q->task = current;
}
/**
* queue_me() - Enqueue the futex_q on the futex_hash_bucket
* @q: The futex_q to enqueue
* @hb: The destination hash bucket
*
* The hb->lock must be held by the caller, and is released here. A call to
* queue_me() is typically paired with exactly one call to unqueue_me(). The
* exceptions involve the PI related operations, which may use unqueue_me_pi()
* or nothing if the unqueue is done as part of the wake process and the unqueue
* state is implicit in the state of woken task (see futex_wait_requeue_pi() for
* an example).
*/
static inline void queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
__releases(&hb->lock)
{
__queue_me(q, hb);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
}
/**
* unqueue_me() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
*
* The q->lock_ptr must not be held by the caller. A call to unqueue_me() must
* be paired with exactly one earlier call to queue_me().
*
* Return:
* - 1 - if the futex_q was still queued (and we removed unqueued it);
* - 0 - if the futex_q was already removed by the waking thread
*/
static int unqueue_me(struct futex_q *q)
{
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
int ret = 0;
/* In the common case we don't take the spinlock, which is nice. */
retry:
/*
* q->lock_ptr can change between this read and the following spin_lock.
* Use READ_ONCE to forbid the compiler from reloading q->lock_ptr and
* optimizing lock_ptr out of the logic below.
*/
lock_ptr = READ_ONCE(q->lock_ptr);
if (lock_ptr != NULL) {
spin_lock(lock_ptr);
/*
* q->lock_ptr can change between reading it and
* spin_lock(), causing us to take the wrong lock. This
* corrects the race condition.
*
* Reasoning goes like this: if we have the wrong lock,
* q->lock_ptr must have changed (maybe several times)
* between reading it and the spin_lock(). It can
* change again after the spin_lock() but only if it was
* already changed before the spin_lock(). It cannot,
* however, change back to the original value. Therefore
* we can detect whether we acquired the correct lock.
*/
if (unlikely(lock_ptr != q->lock_ptr)) {
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
goto retry;
}
__unqueue_futex(q);
BUG_ON(q->pi_state);
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* PI futexes can not be requeued and must remove themselves from the
* hash bucket. The hash bucket lock (i.e. lock_ptr) is held.
*/
static void unqueue_me_pi(struct futex_q *q)
{
__unqueue_futex(q);
BUG_ON(!q->pi_state);
put_pi_state(q->pi_state);
q->pi_state = NULL;
}
static int __fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q,
struct task_struct *argowner)
{
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = q->pi_state;
struct task_struct *oldowner, *newowner;
u32 uval, curval, newval, newtid;
int err = 0;
oldowner = pi_state->owner;
/*
* We are here because either:
*
* - we stole the lock and pi_state->owner needs updating to reflect
* that (@argowner == current),
*
* or:
*
* - someone stole our lock and we need to fix things to point to the
* new owner (@argowner == NULL).
*
* Either way, we have to replace the TID in the user space variable.
* This must be atomic as we have to preserve the owner died bit here.
*
* Note: We write the user space value _before_ changing the pi_state
* because we can fault here. Imagine swapped out pages or a fork
* that marked all the anonymous memory readonly for cow.
*
* Modifying pi_state _before_ the user space value would leave the
* pi_state in an inconsistent state when we fault here, because we
* need to drop the locks to handle the fault. This might be observed
* in the PID checks when attaching to PI state .
*/
retry:
if (!argowner) {
if (oldowner != current) {
/*
* We raced against a concurrent self; things are
* already fixed up. Nothing to do.
*/
return 0;
}
if (__rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
/* We got the lock. pi_state is correct. Tell caller. */
return 1;
}
/*
* The trylock just failed, so either there is an owner or
* there is a higher priority waiter than this one.
*/
newowner = rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
/*
* If the higher priority waiter has not yet taken over the
* rtmutex then newowner is NULL. We can't return here with
* that state because it's inconsistent vs. the user space
* state. So drop the locks and try again. It's a valid
* situation and not any different from the other retry
* conditions.
*/
if (unlikely(!newowner)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto handle_err;
}
} else {
WARN_ON_ONCE(argowner != current);
if (oldowner == current) {
/*
* We raced against a concurrent self; things are
* already fixed up. Nothing to do.
*/
return 1;
}
newowner = argowner;
}
newtid = task_pid_vnr(newowner) | FUTEX_WAITERS;
/* Owner died? */
if (!pi_state->owner)
newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
err = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
if (err)
goto handle_err;
for (;;) {
newval = (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) | newtid;
err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
if (err)
goto handle_err;
if (curval == uval)
break;
uval = curval;
}
/*
* We fixed up user space. Now we need to fix the pi_state
* itself.
*/
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, newowner);
return argowner == current;
/*
* In order to reschedule or handle a page fault, we need to drop the
* locks here. In the case of a fault, this gives the other task
* (either the highest priority waiter itself or the task which stole
* the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the pi_state. So once we
* are back from handling the fault we need to check the pi_state after
* reacquiring the locks and before trying to do another fixup. When
* the fixup has been done already we simply return.
*
* Note: we hold both hb->lock and pi_mutex->wait_lock. We can safely
* drop hb->lock since the caller owns the hb -> futex_q relation.
* Dropping the pi_mutex->wait_lock requires the state revalidate.
*/
handle_err:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
switch (err) {
case -EFAULT:
err = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
break;
case -EAGAIN:
cond_resched();
err = 0;
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
break;
}
spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
/*
* Check if someone else fixed it for us:
*/
if (pi_state->owner != oldowner)
return argowner == current;
/* Retry if err was -EAGAIN or the fault in succeeded */
if (!err)
goto retry;
/*
* fault_in_user_writeable() failed so user state is immutable. At
* best we can make the kernel state consistent but user state will
* be most likely hosed and any subsequent unlock operation will be
* rejected due to PI futex rule [10].
*
* Ensure that the rtmutex owner is also the pi_state owner despite
* the user space value claiming something different. There is no
* point in unlocking the rtmutex if current is the owner as it
* would need to wait until the next waiter has taken the rtmutex
* to guarantee consistent state. Keep it simple. Userspace asked
* for this wreckaged state.
*
* The rtmutex has an owner - either current or some other
* task. See the EAGAIN loop above.
*/
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex));
return err;
}
static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q,
struct task_struct *argowner)
{
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = q->pi_state;
int ret;
lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
ret = __fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, argowner);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
return ret;
}
static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart);
/**
* fixup_owner() - Post lock pi_state and corner case management
* @uaddr: user address of the futex
* @q: futex_q (contains pi_state and access to the rt_mutex)
* @locked: if the attempt to take the rt_mutex succeeded (1) or not (0)
*
* After attempting to lock an rt_mutex, this function is called to cleanup
* the pi_state owner as well as handle race conditions that may allow us to
* acquire the lock. Must be called with the hb lock held.
*
* Return:
* - 1 - success, lock taken;
* - 0 - success, lock not taken;
* - <0 - on error (-EFAULT)
*/
static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked)
{
if (locked) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case:
*
* Speculative pi_state->owner read (we don't hold wait_lock);
* since we own the lock pi_state->owner == current is the
* stable state, anything else needs more attention.
*/
if (q->pi_state->owner != current)
return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
return 1;
}
/*
* If we didn't get the lock; check if anybody stole it from us. In
* that case, we need to fix up the uval to point to them instead of
* us, otherwise bad things happen. [10]
*
* Another speculative read; pi_state->owner == current is unstable
* but needs our attention.
*/
if (q->pi_state->owner == current)
return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, NULL);
/*
* Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock, then we should not be
* the owner of the rt_mutex. Warn and establish consistent state.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex) == current))
return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
return 0;
}
/**
* futex_wait_queue_me() - queue_me() and wait for wakeup, timeout, or signal
* @hb: the futex hash bucket, must be locked by the caller
* @q: the futex_q to queue up on
* @timeout: the prepared hrtimer_sleeper, or null for no timeout
*/
static void futex_wait_queue_me(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, struct futex_q *q,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
/*
* The task state is guaranteed to be set before another task can
* wake it. set_current_state() is implemented using smp_store_mb() and
* queue_me() calls spin_unlock() upon completion, both serializing
* access to the hash list and forcing another memory barrier.
*/
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
queue_me(q, hb);
/* Arm the timer */
if (timeout)
hrtimer_sleeper_start_expires(timeout, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
/*
* If we have been removed from the hash list, then another task
* has tried to wake us, and we can skip the call to schedule().
*/
if (likely(!plist_node_empty(&q->list))) {
/*
* If the timer has already expired, current will already be
* flagged for rescheduling. Only call schedule if there
* is no timeout, or if it has yet to expire.
*/
if (!timeout || timeout->task)
freezable_schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
/**
* futex_wait_setup() - Prepare to wait on a futex
* @uaddr: the futex userspace address
* @val: the expected value
* @flags: futex flags (FLAGS_SHARED, etc.)
* @q: the associated futex_q
* @hb: storage for hash_bucket pointer to be returned to caller
*
* Setup the futex_q and locate the hash_bucket. Get the futex value and
* compare it with the expected value. Handle atomic faults internally.
* Return with the hb lock held on success, and unlocked on failure.
*
* Return:
* - 0 - uaddr contains val and hb has been locked;
* - <1 - -EFAULT or -EWOULDBLOCK (uaddr does not contain val) and hb is unlocked
*/
static int futex_wait_setup(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 val, unsigned int flags,
struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket **hb)
{
u32 uval;
int ret;
/*
* Access the page AFTER the hash-bucket is locked.
* Order is important:
*
* Userspace waiter: val = var; if (cond(val)) futex_wait(&var, val);
* Userspace waker: if (cond(var)) { var = new; futex_wake(&var); }
*
* The basic logical guarantee of a futex is that it blocks ONLY
* if cond(var) is known to be true at the time of blocking, for
* any cond. If we locked the hash-bucket after testing *uaddr, that
* would open a race condition where we could block indefinitely with
* cond(var) false, which would violate the guarantee.
*
* On the other hand, we insert q and release the hash-bucket only
* after testing *uaddr. This guarantees that futex_wait() will NOT
* absorb a wakeup if *uaddr does not match the desired values
* while the syscall executes.
*/
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q->key, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
retry_private:
*hb = queue_lock(q);
ret = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
if (ret) {
queue_unlock(*hb);
ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
goto retry_private;
goto retry;
}
if (uval != val) {
queue_unlock(*hb);
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
return ret;
}
static int futex_wait(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, u32 val,
ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
struct restart_block *restart;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int ret;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
q.bitset = bitset;
to = futex_setup_timer(abs_time, &timeout, flags,
current->timer_slack_ns);
retry:
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, it holds hb->lock and q
* is initialized.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* queue_me and wait for wakeup, timeout, or a signal. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
/* If we were woken (and unqueued), we succeeded, whatever. */
ret = 0;
if (!unqueue_me(&q))
goto out;
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
if (to && !to->task)
goto out;
/*
* We expect signal_pending(current), but we might be the
* victim of a spurious wakeup as well.
*/
if (!signal_pending(current))
goto retry;
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!abs_time)
goto out;
restart = &current->restart_block;
restart->futex.uaddr = uaddr;
restart->futex.val = val;
restart->futex.time = *abs_time;
restart->futex.bitset = bitset;
restart->futex.flags = flags | FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT;
ret = set_restart_fn(restart, futex_wait_restart);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart)
{
u32 __user *uaddr = restart->futex.uaddr;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
if (restart->futex.flags & FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT) {
t = restart->futex.time;
tp = &t;
}
restart->fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
return (long)futex_wait(uaddr, restart->futex.flags,
restart->futex.val, tp, restart->futex.bitset);
}
/*
* Userspace tried a 0 -> TID atomic transition of the futex value
* and failed. The kernel side here does the whole locking operation:
* if there are waiters then it will block as a consequence of relying
* on rt-mutexes, it does PI, etc. (Due to races the kernel might see
* a 0 value of the futex too.).
*
* Also serves as futex trylock_pi()'ing, and due semantics.
*/
static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
ktime_t *time, int trylock)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
int res, ret;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI))
return -ENOSYS;
if (refill_pi_state_cache())
return -ENOMEM;
to = futex_setup_timer(time, &timeout, flags, 0);
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q.key, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
retry_private:
hb = queue_lock(&q);
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(uaddr, hb, &q.key, &q.pi_state, current,
&exiting, 0);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
/*
* Atomic work succeeded and we got the lock,
* or failed. Either way, we do _not_ block.
*/
switch (ret) {
case 1:
/* We got the lock. */
ret = 0;
goto out_unlock_put_key;
case -EFAULT:
goto uaddr_faulted;
case -EBUSY:
case -EAGAIN:
/*
* Two reasons for this:
* - EBUSY: Task is exiting and we just wait for the
* exit to complete.
* - EAGAIN: The user space value changed.
*/
queue_unlock(hb);
/*
* Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of
* exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise
* this task might loop forever, aka. live lock.
*/
wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting);
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
goto out_unlock_put_key;
}
}
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
/*
* Only actually queue now that the atomic ops are done:
*/
__queue_me(&q, hb);
if (trylock) {
ret = rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex);
/* Fixup the trylock return value: */
ret = ret ? 0 : -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto no_block;
}
rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
/*
* On PREEMPT_RT_FULL, when hb->lock becomes an rt_mutex, we must not
* hold it while doing rt_mutex_start_proxy(), because then it will
* include hb->lock in the blocking chain, even through we'll not in
* fact hold it while blocking. This will lead it to report -EDEADLK
* and BUG when futex_unlock_pi() interleaves with this.
*
* Therefore acquire wait_lock while holding hb->lock, but drop the
* latter before calling __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This
* interleaves with futex_unlock_pi() -- which does a similar lock
* handoff -- such that the latter can observe the futex_q::pi_state
* before __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() is done.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() unconditionally enqueues the @rt_waiter
* such that futex_unlock_pi() is guaranteed to observe the waiter when
* it sees the futex_q::pi_state.
*/
ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
if (ret) {
if (ret == 1)
ret = 0;
goto cleanup;
}
if (unlikely(to))
hrtimer_sleeper_start_expires(to, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
cleanup:
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* If we failed to acquire the lock (deadlock/signal/timeout), we must
* first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
* rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex wait
* lists consistent.
*
* In particular; it is important that futex_unlock_pi() can not
* observe this inconsistency.
*/
if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
ret = 0;
no_block:
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, propagate that. If it acquired
* the lock, clear our -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
goto out;
out_unlock_put_key:
queue_unlock(hb);
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret != -EINTR ? ret : -ERESTARTNOINTR;
uaddr_faulted:
queue_unlock(hb);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
goto retry_private;
goto retry;
}
/*
* Userspace attempted a TID -> 0 atomic transition, and failed.
* This is the in-kernel slowpath: we look up the PI state (if any),
* and do the rt-mutex unlock.
*/
static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags)
{
u32 curval, uval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(current);
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *top_waiter;
int ret;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI))
return -ENOSYS;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We release only a lock we actually own:
*/
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
return -EPERM;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (ret)
return ret;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
/*
* Check waiters first. We do not trust user space values at
* all and we at least want to know if user space fiddled
* with the futex value instead of blindly unlocking.
*/
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, &key);
if (top_waiter) {
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = top_waiter->pi_state;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!pi_state)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If current does not own the pi_state then the futex is
* inconsistent and user space fiddled with the futex value.
*/
if (pi_state->owner != current)
goto out_unlock;
get_pi_state(pi_state);
/*
* By taking wait_lock while still holding hb->lock, we ensure
* there is no point where we hold neither; and therefore
* wake_futex_pi() must observe a state consistent with what we
* observed.
*
* In particular; this forces __rt_mutex_start_proxy() to
* complete such that we're guaranteed to observe the
* rt_waiter. Also see the WARN in wake_futex_pi().
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
/* drops pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock */
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, pi_state);
put_pi_state(pi_state);
/*
* Success, we're done! No tricky corner cases.
*/
if (!ret)
return ret;
/*
* The atomic access to the futex value generated a
* pagefault, so retry the user-access and the wakeup:
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
/*
* A unconditional UNLOCK_PI op raced against a waiter
* setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit. Try again.
*/
if (ret == -EAGAIN)
goto pi_retry;
/*
* wake_futex_pi has detected invalid state. Tell user
* space.
*/
return ret;
}
/*
* We have no kernel internal state, i.e. no waiters in the
* kernel. Waiters which are about to queue themselves are stuck
* on hb->lock. So we can safely ignore them. We do neither
* preserve the WAITERS bit not the OWNER_DIED one. We are the
* owner.
*/
if ((ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0))) {
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
switch (ret) {
case -EFAULT:
goto pi_faulted;
case -EAGAIN:
goto pi_retry;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return ret;
}
}
/*
* If uval has changed, let user space handle it.
*/
ret = (curval == uval) ? 0 : -EAGAIN;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
return ret;
pi_retry:
cond_resched();
goto retry;
pi_faulted:
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
}
/**
* handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup() - Handle early wakeup on the initial futex
* @hb: the hash_bucket futex_q was original enqueued on
* @q: the futex_q woken while waiting to be requeued
* @timeout: the timeout associated with the wait (NULL if none)
*
* Determine the cause for the early wakeup.
*
* Return:
* -EWOULDBLOCK or -ETIMEDOUT or -ERESTARTNOINTR
*/
static inline
int handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
struct futex_q *q,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
int ret;
/*
* With the hb lock held, we avoid races while we process the wakeup.
* We only need to hold hb (and not hb2) to ensure atomicity as the
* wakeup code can't change q.key from uaddr to uaddr2 if we hold hb.
* It can't be requeued from uaddr2 to something else since we don't
* support a PI aware source futex for requeue.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(&hb->lock != q->lock_ptr);
/*
* We were woken prior to requeue by a timeout or a signal.
* Unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
*/
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
hb_waiters_dec(hb);
/* Handle spurious wakeups gracefully */
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
else if (signal_pending(current))
ret = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
return ret;
}
/**
* futex_wait_requeue_pi() - Wait on uaddr and take uaddr2
* @uaddr: the futex we initially wait on (non-pi)
* @flags: futex flags (FLAGS_SHARED, FLAGS_CLOCKRT, etc.), they must be
* the same type, no requeueing from private to shared, etc.
* @val: the expected value of uaddr
* @abs_time: absolute timeout
* @bitset: 32 bit wakeup bitset set by userspace, defaults to all
* @uaddr2: the pi futex we will take prior to returning to user-space
*
* The caller will wait on uaddr and will be requeued by futex_requeue() to
* uaddr2 which must be PI aware and unique from uaddr. Normal wakeup will wake
* on uaddr2 and complete the acquisition of the rt_mutex prior to returning to
* userspace. This ensures the rt_mutex maintains an owner when it has waiters;
* without one, the pi logic would not know which task to boost/deboost, if
* there was a need to.
*
* We call schedule in futex_wait_queue_me() when we enqueue and return there
* via the following--
* 1) wakeup on uaddr2 after an atomic lock acquisition by futex_requeue()
* 2) wakeup on uaddr2 after a requeue
* 3) signal
* 4) timeout
*
* If 3, cleanup and return -ERESTARTNOINTR.
*
* If 2, we may then block on trying to take the rt_mutex and return via:
* 5) successful lock
* 6) signal
* 7) timeout
* 8) other lock acquisition failure
*
* If 6, return -EWOULDBLOCK (restarting the syscall would do the same).
*
* If 4 or 7, we cleanup and return with -ETIMEDOUT.
*
* Return:
* - 0 - On success;
* - <0 - On error
*/
static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
u32 __user *uaddr2)
{
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
struct rt_mutex_base *pi_mutex;
int res, ret;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI))
return -ENOSYS;
if (uaddr == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
to = futex_setup_timer(abs_time, &timeout, flags,
current->timer_slack_ns);
/*
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
*/
rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
q.bitset = bitset;
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
/*
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, it holds hb->lock and q
* is initialized.
*/
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
if (ret)
goto out;
/*
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
*/
if (match_futex(&q.key, &key2)) {
queue_unlock(hb);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
switch (futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync(&q)) {
case Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE:
/* The waiter is still on uaddr1 */
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, to);
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
break;
case Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED:
/* The requeue acquired the lock */
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
ret = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, true);
/*
* Drop the reference to the pi state which the
* requeue_pi() code acquired for us.
*/
put_pi_state(q.pi_state);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
/*
* Adjust the return value. It's either -EFAULT or
* success (1) but the caller expects 0 for success.
*/
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
}
break;
case Q_REQUEUE_PI_DONE:
/* Requeue completed. Current is 'pi_blocked_on' the rtmutex */
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
/* Current is not longer pi_blocked_on */
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
ret = 0;
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
/*
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
* haven't already.
*/
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
/*
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, propagate that. If it
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
*/
if (res)
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
if (ret == -EINTR) {
/*
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart
* by calling futex_lock_pi() directly. We could
* restart this syscall, but it would detect that
* the user space "val" changed and return
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart
* and return -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
*/
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
break;
default:
BUG();
}
out:
if (to) {
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Support for robust futexes: the kernel cleans up held futexes at
* thread exit time.
*
* Implementation: user-space maintains a per-thread list of locks it
* is holding. Upon do_exit(), the kernel carefully walks this list,
* and marks all locks that are owned by this thread with the
* FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit, and wakes up a waiter (if any). The list is
* always manipulated with the lock held, so the list is private and
* per-thread. Userspace also maintains a per-thread 'list_op_pending'
* field, to allow the kernel to clean up if the thread dies after
* acquiring the lock, but just before it could have added itself to
* the list. There can only be one such pending lock.
*/
/**
* sys_set_robust_list() - Set the robust-futex list head of a task
* @head: pointer to the list-head
* @len: length of the list-head, as userspace expects
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,
size_t, len)
{
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
/*
* The kernel knows only one size for now:
*/
if (unlikely(len != sizeof(*head)))
return -EINVAL;
current->robust_list = head;
return 0;
}
/**
* sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task
* @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
* @head_ptr: pointer to a list-head pointer, the kernel fills it in
* @len_ptr: pointer to a length field, the kernel fills in the header size
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
struct task_struct *p;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
p = current;
else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/* Constants for the pending_op argument of handle_futex_death */
#define HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING true
#define HANDLE_DEATH_LIST false
/*
* Process a futex-list entry, check whether it's owned by the
* dying task, and do notification if so:
*/
static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr,
bool pi, bool pending_op)
{
u32 uval, nval, mval;
pid_t owner;
int err;
/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
return -1;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -1;
/*
* Special case for regular (non PI) futexes. The unlock path in
* user space has two race scenarios:
*
* 1. The unlock path releases the user space futex value and
* before it can execute the futex() syscall to wake up
* waiters it is killed.
*
* 2. A woken up waiter is killed before it can acquire the
* futex in user space.
*
* In the second case, the wake up notification could be generated
* by the unlock path in user space after setting the futex value
* to zero or by the kernel after setting the OWNER_DIED bit below.
*
* In both cases the TID validation below prevents a wakeup of
* potential waiters which can cause these waiters to block
* forever.
*
* In both cases the following conditions are met:
*
* 1) task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
* @pending_op == true
* 2) The owner part of user space futex value == 0
* 3) Regular futex: @pi == false
*
* If these conditions are met, it is safe to attempt waking up a
* potential waiter without touching the user space futex value and
* trying to set the OWNER_DIED bit. If the futex value is zero,
* the rest of the user space mutex state is consistent, so a woken
* waiter will just take over the uncontended futex. Setting the
* OWNER_DIED bit would create inconsistent state and malfunction
* of the user space owner died handling. Otherwise, the OWNER_DIED
* bit is already set, and the woken waiter is expected to deal with
* this.
*/
owner = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
if (pending_op && !pi && !owner) {
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
return 0;
}
if (owner != task_pid_vnr(curr))
return 0;
/*
* Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
* of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
* via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
* set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
* futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
* to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
* thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
* userspace.
*/
mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
/*
* We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
* the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
* we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
* access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
* verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
* does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
* give up and leave the futex locked.
*/
if ((err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
switch (err) {
case -EFAULT:
if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
return -1;
goto retry;
case -EAGAIN:
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return err;
}
}
if (nval != uval)
goto retry;
/*
* Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
* PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
*/
if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
return 0;
}
/*
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
*/
static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
struct robust_list __user * __user *head,
unsigned int *pi)
{
unsigned long uentry;
if (get_user(uentry, (unsigned long __user *)head))
return -EFAULT;
*entry = (void __user *)(uentry & ~1UL);
*pi = uentry & 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
*
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
*/
static void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head = curr->robust_list;
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
unsigned int next_pi;
unsigned long futex_offset;
int rc;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
* sys_set_robust_list()):
*/
if (fetch_robust_entry(&entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
return;
/*
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
*/
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
return;
/*
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
* if it exists:
*/
if (fetch_robust_entry(&pending, &head->list_op_pending, &pip))
return;
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
while (entry != &head->list) {
/*
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
* handle_futex_death:
*/
rc = fetch_robust_entry(&next_entry, &entry->next, &next_pi);
/*
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
* don't process it twice:
*/
if (entry != pending) {
if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
curr, pi, HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
return;
}
if (rc)
return;
entry = next_entry;
pi = next_pi;
/*
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
*/
if (!--limit)
break;
cond_resched();
}
if (pending) {
handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
}
}
static void futex_cleanup(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
}
#endif
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
}
/**
* futex_exit_recursive - Set the tasks futex state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD
* @tsk: task to set the state on
*
* Set the futex exit state of the task lockless. The futex waiter code
* observes that state when a task is exiting and loops until the task has
* actually finished the futex cleanup. The worst case for this is that the
* waiter runs through the wait loop until the state becomes visible.
*
* This is called from the recursive fault handling path in do_exit().
*
* This is best effort. Either the futex exit code has run already or
* not. If the OWNER_DIED bit has been set on the futex then the waiter can
* take it over. If not, the problem is pushed back to user space. If the
* futex exit code did not run yet, then an already queued waiter might
* block forever, but there is nothing which can be done about that.
*/
void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/* If the state is FUTEX_STATE_EXITING then futex_exit_mutex is held */
if (tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING)
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_DEAD;
}
static void futex_cleanup_begin(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* Prevent various race issues against a concurrent incoming waiter
* including live locks by forcing the waiter to block on
* tsk->futex_exit_mutex when it observes FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in
* attach_to_pi_owner().
*/
mutex_lock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
/*
* Switch the state to FUTEX_STATE_EXITING under tsk->pi_lock.
*
* This ensures that all subsequent checks of tsk->futex_state in
* attach_to_pi_owner() must observe FUTEX_STATE_EXITING with
* tsk->pi_lock held.
*
* It guarantees also that a pi_state which was queued right before
* the state change under tsk->pi_lock by a concurrent waiter must
* be observed in exit_pi_state_list().
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
}
static void futex_cleanup_end(struct task_struct *tsk, int state)
{
/*
* Lockless store. The only side effect is that an observer might
* take another loop until it becomes visible.
*/
tsk->futex_state = state;
/*
* Drop the exit protection. This unblocks waiters which observed
* FUTEX_STATE_EXITING to reevaluate the state.
*/
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
}
void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
/*
* The state handling is done for consistency, but in the case of
* exec() there is no way to prevent further damage as the PID stays
* the same. But for the unlikely and arguably buggy case that a
* futex is held on exec(), this provides at least as much state
* consistency protection which is possible.
*/
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
futex_cleanup(tsk);
/*
* Reset the state to FUTEX_STATE_OK. The task is alive and about
* exec a new binary.
*/
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_OK);
}
void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
futex_cleanup(tsk);
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_DEAD);
}
long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
u32 __user *uaddr2, u32 val2, u32 val3)
{
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
unsigned int flags = 0;
if (!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))
flags |= FLAGS_SHARED;
if (op & FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME) {
flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
if (cmd != FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET && cmd != FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI &&
cmd != FUTEX_LOCK_PI2)
return -ENOSYS;
}
switch (cmd) {
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI2:
case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
}
switch (cmd) {
case FUTEX_WAIT:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
fallthrough;
case FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET:
return futex_wait(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3);
case FUTEX_WAKE:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
fallthrough;
case FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET:
return futex_wake(uaddr, flags, val, val3);
case FUTEX_REQUEUE:
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, NULL, 0);
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE:
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, &val3, 0);
case FUTEX_WAKE_OP:
return futex_wake_op(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, val3);
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
fallthrough;
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI2:
return futex_lock_pi(uaddr, flags, timeout, 0);
case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI:
return futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, flags);
case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI:
return futex_lock_pi(uaddr, flags, NULL, 1);
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
return futex_wait_requeue_pi(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3,
uaddr2);
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, &val3, 1);
}
return -ENOSYS;
}
static __always_inline bool futex_cmd_has_timeout(u32 cmd)
{
switch (cmd) {
case FUTEX_WAIT:
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI2:
case FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET:
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
return true;
}
return false;
}
static __always_inline int
futex_init_timeout(u32 cmd, u32 op, struct timespec64 *ts, ktime_t *t)
{
if (!timespec64_valid(ts))
return -EINVAL;
*t = timespec64_to_ktime(*ts);
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
*t = ktime_add_safe(ktime_get(), *t);
else if (cmd != FUTEX_LOCK_PI && !(op & FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME))
*t = timens_ktime_to_host(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, *t);
return 0;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, utime,
u32 __user *, uaddr2, u32, val3)
{
int ret, cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
struct timespec64 ts;
if (utime && futex_cmd_has_timeout(cmd)) {
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))))
return -EFAULT;
if (get_timespec64(&ts, utime))
return -EFAULT;
ret = futex_init_timeout(cmd, op, &ts, &t);
if (ret)
return ret;
tp = &t;
}
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, (unsigned long)utime, val3);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/*
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
*/
static inline int
compat_fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry, struct robust_list __user **entry,
compat_uptr_t __user *head, unsigned int *pi)
{
if (get_user(*uentry, head))
return -EFAULT;
*entry = compat_ptr((*uentry) & ~1);
*pi = (unsigned int)(*uentry) & 1;
return 0;
}
static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
compat_long_t futex_offset)
{
compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
return uaddr;
}
/*
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
*
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
*/
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
unsigned int next_pi;
compat_uptr_t uentry, next_uentry, upending;
compat_long_t futex_offset;
int rc;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return;
/*
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
* sys_set_robust_list()):
*/
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&uentry, &entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
return;
/*
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
*/
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
return;
/*
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
* if it exists:
*/
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&upending, &pending,
&head->list_op_pending, &pip))
return;
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
while (entry != (struct robust_list __user *) &head->list) {
/*
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
* handle_futex_death:
*/
rc = compat_fetch_robust_entry(&next_uentry, &next_entry,
(compat_uptr_t __user *)&entry->next, &next_pi);
/*
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
* dont process it twice:
*/
if (entry != pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi,
HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
return;
}
if (rc)
return;
uentry = next_uentry;
entry = next_entry;
pi = next_pi;
/*
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
*/
if (!--limit)
break;
cond_resched();
}
if (pending) {
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
}
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list,
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *, head,
compat_size_t, len)
{
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
if (unlikely(len != sizeof(*head)))
return -EINVAL;
current->compat_robust_list = head;
return 0;
}
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr,
compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
struct task_struct *p;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
p = current;
else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->compat_robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex_time32, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
const struct old_timespec32 __user *, utime, u32 __user *, uaddr2,
u32, val3)
{
int ret, cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
struct timespec64 ts;
if (utime && futex_cmd_has_timeout(cmd)) {
if (get_old_timespec32(&ts, utime))
return -EFAULT;
ret = futex_init_timeout(cmd, op, &ts, &t);
if (ret)
return ret;
tp = &t;
}
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, (unsigned long)utime, val3);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME */
static void __init futex_detect_cmpxchg(void)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
u32 curval;
/*
* This will fail and we want it. Some arch implementations do
* runtime detection of the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
* functionality. We want to know that before we call in any
* of the complex code paths. Also we want to prevent
* registration of robust lists in that case. NULL is
* guaranteed to fault and we get -EFAULT on functional
* implementation, the non-functional ones will return
* -ENOSYS.
*/
if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, NULL, 0, 0) == -EFAULT)
futex_cmpxchg_enabled = 1;
#endif
}
static int __init futex_init(void)
{
unsigned int futex_shift;
unsigned long i;
#if CONFIG_BASE_SMALL
futex_hashsize = 16;
#else
futex_hashsize = roundup_pow_of_two(256 * num_possible_cpus());
#endif
futex_queues = alloc_large_system_hash("futex", sizeof(*futex_queues),
futex_hashsize, 0,
futex_hashsize < 256 ? HASH_SMALL : 0,
&futex_shift, NULL,
futex_hashsize, futex_hashsize);
futex_hashsize = 1UL << futex_shift;
futex_detect_cmpxchg();
for (i = 0; i < futex_hashsize; i++) {
atomic_set(&futex_queues[i].waiters, 0);
plist_head_init(&futex_queues[i].chain);
spin_lock_init(&futex_queues[i].lock);
}
return 0;
}
core_initcall(futex_init);